The Expanded Debate over the Future of the
Regulatory State
Thomas 0. McGarityt

If the regulatory state is at a crossroads, it is because the
winners of the 1994 elections have elevated the usually dry topic
of federal regulation to a highly visible status. During the summer of 1995, the prominence in the news media of articles and
editorials about cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, scope of
judicial review, and regulatory budgets caused twinges of excitement in the normally leaden breasts of public policy wonks; these
self-styled experts then raced to Capitol Hill in droves to testify
on the virtues and limitations of this or that species of regulatory
reform. Following the hearings, members of Congress took to the
floor with fancy props to debate esoteric language designed to
change fundamentally the way federal agencies do business.
The primary significance of the 1994 elections for the continuing debate over the role of regulation in society has been to
reopen previously settled questions and to revive positions that
have remained virtually dormant since the New Deal. Congress
is now within a vote or two of enacting radical changes to the
Administrative Procedure Act that would significantly affect both
the pace and substantive content of federal regulation. Also on
the table are radical changes to environmental statutes, occupational safety and health laws, banking regulation, and legal
protections against employment discrimination. These have not
been especially attractive developments for those (often among
the beneficiaries of existing regulatory programs) who believe
that government has an important role to play in a robust capitalist economy and who would not welcome a return to the moral
and legal regime of late nineteenth-century America. Although
defenders of the federal regulatory bureaucracy are rarely featured on the evening news or the radio talk shows, the programs
that the much reviled bureaucrats administer provide a crucial
protective shield against the misery and waste that always
accompany the abuse of private power.
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This Essay proffers two foundational ideas in Part I: (1)
Congress enacted most of the existing federal regulatory statutes
to protect some citizens from the adverse consequences of the
conduct of others; and (2) the rationales for these protections go
beyond the "broken market" explanation offered by many regulatory reformers as the appropriate basis for government intervention into private arrangements. Rejecting the contention that the
1994 elections reflect a paradigm shift among the general public
on the subject of federal regulation, Part II places the current
expanded debate in historical perspective by briefly relating the
history of regulation and regulatory reform. Part HI then turns
to the debate itself and sorts the participants into five broad
categories: the radical anti-interventionists, the free marketeers,
the modern mugwumps, the good government reinventionists,
and the unrepentant protectionists. In describing the characteristics of each camp, this Part attempts to convey a sense of the
nature and complexity of the current debate. Finally, Part IV
speculates on how the debate is likely to be resolved in the near
term.
I. REGULATION AS PROTECTION
The impetus behind most federal regulatory programs has
been a demand by ordinary citizens for protection from the adverse consequences of the conduct of other citizens acting individually or (more often) collectively through corporations and other
economic entities.1 An administrative regulatory regime is not
the only vehicle available to government for protecting some of
its citizens from the conduct of others. Criminal codes, for example, usually address conduct that most citizens know to be wrong.
The common law of torts indirectly protects individuals by making it clear in advance that persons engaged in some kinds of
activities will have to compensate persons who are harmed thereby. Self-help also may be available to an individual who believes
that he or she is entitled to protection from another's activities
and has the wherewithal to provide that protection. However, the
failure of these alternatives to successfully protect citizens from

1

Not all regulatory programs were created to protect the weak from the powerful. In

a democratic society, legislatures are constantly bombarded by appeals from citizens who
would extract private economic gains from ostensibly protective legislation. Some cynical
opponents of government regulation would place most, if not all, regulation in this category. While some regulation exists primarily to protect private cartels, I believe that it constitutes a small and diminishing proportion of all federal regulation.
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others has led to the continuous evolution of federal regulatory
programs over the last century.
Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1887, Congress has created several regulatory regimes in which
agencies protect citizens from abusive and discriminatory practices of monopolies and cartels by establishing rates, allocating
routes, and providing standards for quality of service.2 Although
Congress has relied for the most part upon self-help to address
misleading and abusive business practices outside of monopolistic
contexts, it has recognized that self-help is not an adequate remedy in many cases. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") all regulate the terms and
conditions of certain contractual relationships to ensure that
poorly informed consumers are not duped by unscrupulous sellers. Finally, Congress has recognized that some economic relationships naturally give rise to the potential for abuse because of
the unequal bargaining power of the participants. For example,
since individual employees rarely have the power to bargain with
large employers over terms and conditions of employment, the
National Labor Relations Act allows employees to bargain collectively with employers and establishes the ground rules for the
exercise of employer and collective employee power.3
With the enactment of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of
1906,' Congress began to protect citizens from business practices
that posed unacceptable health and safety risks. Since then,
Congress has empowered agencies like the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") to remove unhealthful or dangerous products from the
market and to promulgate standards to ensure food quality and

2 See generally Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 37-

416 (Oxford 1941) (detailing the development and operation of regulatory commissions
from 1887 through the New Deal).
' Government intervention for this purpose involves a careful balancing process. In
addition, government power aimed at equalizing private bargaining power can be manipulated by private individuals to empower them to harm others. For example, labor unions
have historically been some of the worst purveyors of unfair employment practices. See,
for example, David E. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass. The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudenceand the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 Am U L Rev 85, 91-96 (1993)
(chronicling the "Rascist [sic] History of American Labor Unions").
4 Pub L No 59-384, 34 Stat 768, codified at 21 USC §§ 1-15 (1934), repealed by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 902(a), Pub L No 75-717, 52 Stat 1040,
1059, codified at 21 USC § 301 (1994).
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protect the environment. Congress has also created regulatory
programs to protect the interests of all citizens in common resources, like the radio frequency spectrum, endangered species,
and pristine wilderness areas.5
During the last forty years, Congress has assigned a high
priority to protecting victims of invidious discrimination. For
example, unlike common law contract and tort litigation, Congress, not the courts, has established substantive regulatory
requirements to govern litigation under statutes aimed at eliminating irrational discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
national origin, age, or disability. Congress has also established
procedures to protect employees from being discharged for
"whistleblowing," advocating a union, and engaging in other
activities that advance the public interest.6
In the preceding description, I have carefully avoided employing "correcting for market failure" as a rationale for regulation. The academic literature on regulation and regulatory reform
thrives on sophisticated theoretical analyses of market failure,
regulatory mismatches, and techniques for fixing broken markets.' Many academic regulatory reformers presume that unimpeded markets are the best way to allocate scarce resources and
demand that any government intervention be justified as an
effective corrective to some identified market failure. Although
this "broken market" paradigm may be useful analytically for
studying some kinds of regulation, it rarely explains why Congress. enacted protective statutes.
When Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, the debates
were not filled with talk about "externalities" and "spillovers."

' Government regulation may be the only way to protect the shared interest of all
citizens in having a common resource available. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1245-48 (1968). At the same time, such regulation can
empower some private entities to harm others. Allocating all of the available spaces in the
radio frequency spectrum to stations that distribute racist propaganda, for example, could
harm the minorities who are the victims of that sort of propaganda.
6 See, for example, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 84
Stat 1590, codified as amended at 29 USC § 660(c) (1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as amended at 29 USC § 623
(1994); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2044, codified as
amended at 15 USC § 2622 (1994). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protectionsin an At-Will World, 74 Tex L Rev 1655 (1996).
' For example, see generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv L Rev 547 (1979) (discussing
all three approaches at length). Breyer asserts that "the most important justifications for
government regulation of the economy are well described as instances of classical market
failure." Id at 553.
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When the Occupational Safety and Health Act was debated, no
congressperson stood up on the floor of the House to suggest that
bargaining between employers and employees was distorted by
the lack of communication of risk-related information. The supporters of the Clean Water Act and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act related horror stories of fish kills, flaming rivers,
horrible explosions, and debilitating workplace diseases.' The
congressional committees that considered these bills did not demand that advocates of federal regulation identify particular
market failures and specify appropriate tools for fixing those failures. Instead, the impetus behind most regulatory programs has
been concern about abuse of power by private individuals and
corporations. Furthermore, the regulatory techniques adopted by
Congress have generally been aimed at stopping the harm and
bringing about a rapid end to the suffering, rather than at
achieving the most efficient expenditure of private resources.
Similarly, the current debates over regulatory reform in
Congress have been less about "regulatory mismatches" identified
by supporters of the broken-market paradigm than about abuse
of government power by unelected bureaucrats. The legislative
debates during the summer of 1995 were filled with horror stories of small businesses being raked over the coals by abusive
government inspectors and alleged regulatory stupidity in writing
pointless or perverse regulations.' In sum, past and present regulatory reformers have rarely focused on market failure as the
basis of regulation.

8

See, for example, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, S Rep No 91-1282,

91st Cong, 2d Sess 3-4, reprinted in 1970 USCCAN 5177, 5179-80 (providing examples of
brown lung in cotton textile workers, asbestosis and mesothelioma in asbestos workers,
and pesticide poisonings in farm workers).
' See, for example, Kay Bailey Hutchison, FederalRules Must Make Sense, Dallas
Morning News 5J (Feb 5, 1995) (relating story of construction company cited by OSHA
when its employees failed to wear hard hats in an emergency attempt to save the life of a
worker in a collapsed trench); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, Hearings
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 17, 1995)
(statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) (relating story of bank that was required to put
Braille keypads on drive-through automatic teller machines); Regulatory Transition Act of
1995, HR Rep No 104-39, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 9 (noting safety regulation requiring that
buckets leak so as to prevent infant drowning). Many of the horror stories, including the
leaking buckets, were either untrue or grossly misleading. See Comprehensive Regulatory
Reform Act of 1995, S Rep No 104-90, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 154-55 (supplemental views of
Senator Leahy).
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II. REGULATION AND REACTION
The regulatory programs described above were enacted only
after fierce political battles between advocates of protective governmental action and advocates of free markets. Indeed, the
modern regulatory state emerged out of the extraordinary efforts
to address the social catastrophe of the Great Depression.' ° For
many observers, the progressive forces favoring government intervention achieved a nearly irreversible victory during the New
Deal years, which, in their view, represented a critical turning
point in American history not unlike the emergence of the Constitution out of the Articles of Confederation and the emergence
of a powerful federal government out of the ashes of the Civil
War during the Reconstruction period.
Professor Bruce Ackerman has characterized the New Deal
shift in conventional wisdom concerning the proper role for government as a "constitutional moment." With that shift, "the New
Deal Democrats amended the Constitution by provoking a complex constitutional dialogue between the voters at large and institutions of the national government, a dialogue that ultimately
substituted for the more federalistic processes of constitutional
revision detailed in Article Five."" Yet, at the same time that
Professor Ackerman's "dualistic" analysis affords a special permanence to the regulatory state, it also suggests that other
transformative experiences are waiting to happen, and indeed
may be happening at this moment.' In examining the regulatoCongress had enacted several important regulatory programs prior to the New
Deal, but they did not intrude greatly into private economic arrangements, and the
intrusions were usually limited to particular industries. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Reform and the Positive State: An HistoricalOverview, 38 Admin L Rev 399, 400-01
(1986).
" Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale L J 453, 459
(1989). Professor Ackerman's ambitious undertaking is not without its critics. For example, see generally William W. Fisher, HI, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U Chi L Rev 955
(1992); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1519-24 (1988)
(characterizing Professor Ackerman's approach as "authoritarian constitutional jurisprudence"); Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and
the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan L Rev 247, 253-54 & n 23 (1996) (recognizing the New Deal
as a "constitutional moment," but only in a metaphorical sense-a metaphorical moment,
so to speak).
' See Bruce A. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 Harv L Rev 1164, 1178
(1988) (acknowledging the possibility of another "constitutional moment" during the
Reagan administration, but citing the failure of the Senate to confirm Robert Bork as
evidence that it did not occur). Professor Michelman likens Professor Ackerman's constitutional moments to Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm shifts" in the context of the evolution of
scientific thought. Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1522-23 (cited in note 11). See also Thomas
S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962).
10

1996]

The Future of the Regulatory State

1469

ry state at a crossroads, it may be appropriate to ask whether the
United States is currently engaged in similar "higher lawmaking"
in which 'We the People"" are speaking once again. Certainly
the winners of the 1994 elections would like to think that the
regulatory reform statutes they plan to enact during the next few
years "represent the considered judgment of a mobilized majority
of American citizens."'4 Professor Sunstein, for one, welcomes
this possibility with unconcealed enthusiasm. 5
Professor Ackerman might respond that the current conservative Republican ascendancy reflects merely a public reaction to,
and partial rejection of, the civil rights-public interest movement
of the activist 1960s and not a fundamental rejection of the New
Deal regulatory state. In this view, the proponents of activist
government went too far: in protecting health, safety, and the
environment past the point at which costs equalled benefits; in
pampering consumers; and in pushing government's approach to
civil rights beyond protection to affirmative action and mandatory accommodation. For Ackerman, the regulatory state bequeathed by the New Deal is, at its core, alive and well. Liberals
and conservatives alike still accept the basic New Deal principles,
and the regulatory reformers mean only to restore a sense of
balance.
This benign view of the objectives of the regulatory reformers
since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 is, in my view, fundamentally at odds with the facts. Many conservative advocates
of regulatory reform have in mind a full-scale return to the business-oriented, laissez-faire principles that dominated this country
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Their lobbyists
and their more moderate allies in Congress may urge caution and
compromise at any particular juncture, but the overall goal is to
wipe out the legislative legacy, not only of the Sixties, but also of
previous waves of activist government, including the New
Deal. 6

Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People 7-8 (Belknap 1991).
Ackerman, 99 Yale L J at 464 (cited in note 11) (noting that the dualist denies that
all statutes that gain a legislative majority in Washington represent the considered judgment of a mobilized majority). Of course, few of the conservative victors of the 1994 elections would agree with Ackerman's "constitutional moment" thesis in the first place.
" Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 257 (cited in note 11).
16 See James Allen Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New
Policy Elite 22 (Free Press 1991) ("The conservative revolt was really a frontal assault on
the pragmatic philosophical assumptions that have been at the core of American politics ... since the turn of the century."). See also id at 220-23 (describing the agenda of
leading conservative libertarian think tanks).
"
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To gain a glimpse of the future envisioned by many regulatory reformers, we must travel backward past the New Deal and
the Progressive Era to the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Like Professor Ackerman, I view the Reconstruction period as
profoundly important for American political history, but for different reasons. Its importance lies in two developments, neither
of which grew directly out of the Reconstruction Amendments
and associated implementing legislation. First, the conclusion of
the Civil War marked the end of the transformation of the American economy from a mercantile/agrarian economy to an aggressive financial/industrial economy. Second, at all levels of government, the laissez-faire principle became the dominant theory of
social welfare. Under the banner of laissez-faire, huge private
enterprises were assembled and destroyed, and mountains and
deserts were conquered and despoiled. Poor immigrants and former slaves, working for subsistence wages, built the railroads,
labored at the factories, and dug the mines that powered an
enormous economic expansion,' 7 and they were injured and
killed by the hundreds in the process. 8 Seventy-two-hour work
weeks were not uncommon when business was good, and wage
cuts 9and layoffs were inevitable when the economy turned
1
sour.

The laissez-faire principle also extended to the businessgovernment interface. Public officials and legislators were enriched by business opportunities and outright bribes proffered by
the great financiers and industrialists of the time."
Despite the increasingly evident human and ecological devastation brought about by excessive greed and corruption, little
action was taken at either the state or the federal level. When
some states began to exercise their powers to protect the victims
of runaway industrialization, the Supreme Court, steeped in
laissez-faire ideology, struck their efforts down.2 ' At the federal
" The United States economy grew during the last quarter of the nineteenth century
by almost every conceivable measure-overall production of goods and services, output per
man hour, value of land, and overall wealth. See Ray Ginger, Age of Excess: The United
States from 1877-1914 90-92 (Macmillan 2d ed 1975).
"8 See Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The GreatAmerican Capitalists18611901 ch 4 (Harcourt 1934).
Ginger, Age of Excess at 57 (cited in note 17).
20 John M. Blum, et al, The NationalExperience: A History of the United States 420,

422-23 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1963) (Central Pacific Railroad principal, Collis Huntington, "talked about bribing and buying congressmen as he would about the purchase of
so many cattle."); Josephson, Robber Barons at 84, 222-23 (cited in note 18) ("The passage
of a bill involved 'arguments' in the form of considerable sums of cash.").
21 See, for example, Wabash, St. Louis and PacificRailway Co. v Illinois, 118 US 557,
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level, a modest reform effort by well heeled members of the East
Coast establishment calling themselves Liberal Republicans (and
later branded "Mugwumps") placed some limitations on governmental graft and corruption, but in the private sector these reformers did not challenge the underlying principle of laissezfaire.22 If any point in time is entitled to elevation to quasi-constitutional status, it might easily be the defeat of emerging populist movements in the elections of 1894 and 1896. These elections
ratified the previous ascendancy of laissez-faire and ushered in
an early twentieth-century political culture in which concentrated
economic power remained largely unchecked."
This period in American history is, in my opinion, exceedingly important because it established a baseline of economic freedom and government largesse to which powerful business entities, their allies in academia and think tanks, and the neo-muckrakers of the conservative media persistently return. As each
wave of reform crested during the twentieth century, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Farm Bureau, and countless other trade associations and business concerns did their best to defeat it. When Congress nevertheless enacted reform, these groups did everything within their
power to resist bureaucratic and judicial implementation. And
finally, when all other attempts at blocking reform failed, these
same interests tacitly sanctioned disobedience or sought relief in
the legislature. In each of these battles, their pleas were cast as
appeals to objectivity, efficiency, common sense, and due process,
but the goal was always the same: a return to the laissez-faire
baseline of the late nineteenth century.24
This is history viewed as a cycle of reform, resistance, and
reaction-swinging like a pendulum, but like a pendulum attached at its apex to a point that is itself lurching forward and

575-77 (1886) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois statute penalizing discriminatory railroad freight rates).
' See Earle Dudley Ross, The LiberalRepublican Movement 238 (Henry Holt 1919);
Gerald W. McFarland, ed, Moralists or Pragmatists?The Mugwumps 1884-1900 2 (Simon
& Schuster 1975).
2
See Blum, et al, NationalExperience at 493 (cited in note 20) (McKinley's victory in
1896 "meant a return to conservatism and another businessman's regime."); John L.
Thomas, AlternativeAmerica: Henry George, EdwardBellamy, Henry Demarest Lloyd and
the Adversary Tradition 334 (Belknap 1983) ("The election of 1896 proved beyond question
that the forces of corporate capitalism that were revolutionizing the rest of American life
had now triumphed at the polls.").
24 See William Greider, Who Will Tell the People?: The Betrayal of American Democracy 56-58 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
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backward. In this view, the New Deal is not transformative; it
merely represents a point at which the reforms were especially
aggressive, the resistance was fairly timid, and the reactions took
longer than usual to have an impact. The business community by
no means accepted the regulatory state as a new baseline after
the New Deal. They resisted it first in court, where they initially
achieved some notable victories.' After the "switch in time" left
a majority of the Supreme Court willing to accept activist government,26 the business community continued to react, but with no
prospect of substantive victory in the political sphere, it was
content to harness the New Deal procedurally through the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA7).2" Finally, when one of the
most powerful of the New Deal agencies, the National Labor
Relations Board, began to flex its muscles on behalf of organized
labor, reformers were able to stimulate enough legislative sympathy to reign in that agency through the enactment of the TaftHartley Act.'
The pendulum began to swing back again in the mid-1960s
and the 1970s with the advent of the civil rights-public interest
movement. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and subse5 See, for example, United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 68-78 (1936) (declaring the
Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional); ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp v United
States, 295 US 495, 542-51 (1935) (declaring portion of the National Industrial Recovery
Act unconstitutional); PanamaRefining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388, 414-33 (1935) (invalidating § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act). See also Peter Irons, The New Deal
Lawyers 71-72, 100-02, 142-43, 150, 153, 192-95, 246-47, 249-52 (Princeton 1982); Michael
Comiskey, Can a PresidentPack-orDraft-the Supreme Court?: FDR and the Court in
the Great Depression and World War II, 57 Albany L Rev 1043, 1045-46 & n 21 (1994)
(reporting that "[i]n the three terms from 1933-34 to 1935-36, the Court struck down or
limited New Deal measures in eleven of thirteen cases"); Clyde P. Weed, The Nemesis of
Reform: The Republican Party during the New Deal 171 (Columbia 1994).
See Comiskey, 57 Albany L Rev at 1046-47 (cited in note 25).
McGarity, 38 Admin L Rev at 402-07 (cited in note 10).
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136, codified
as amended at 29 USC §§ 141-87 (1994). See Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US
474, 487 (1951) (concluding that the Taft-Hartley Act mandated the same scope of judicial
review as the APA). Professor Estlund relates:
With the growing success of labor during and after World War 11, and particularly
following a wave of strikes after the war ended, employers gained a more sympathetic hearing for their complaints that unions were "abusing" their economic power, and
that the Board was biased in favor of unions affiliated with the national federations,
especially the militant Congress of Industrial Organizations, whose growth the Wagner Act helped facilitate.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstandingthe
NationalLabor Relations Act, 71 Tex L Rev 921, 977 n 212 (1993).
2 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e to 2000e-17
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quent amendments reaffirmed the federal role in protecting the
descendants of slaves from irrational discrimination in employment and boldly asserted a new role for the federal government
in protecting women, the aged, and the disabled from such discrimination as well."0 During this time, Congress enacted additional fundamental changes to the regulatory state, including the
landmark Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,"' and
foundational statutes for modern environmental law." Congress
also attempted to revitalize the moribund FTC with the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,3 3 to protect consumers from dangerous products
with the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972,' and to protect
employee pensions from unscrupulous employers with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974."
In addition to favoring a more active federal government,
these statutes also differed from their predecessors in the means
they employed to attain those protections. Most of these new
statutes expressed a clear preference for federal policy making
through the little used tool of informal rule making. Because of
the relative ease with which regulatory agencies could promulgate binding rules, the use of that regulatory tool had the potential to change a much broader range of private conduct much
more rapidly than the use of traditional adjudicatory approaches.
In contrast to previous statutes, the new statutes specified more

(1988 & Supp 1993).
' See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602,
codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 621-34 (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 12101-213 (1994).
3' Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 651 et seq
(1994).
' Important environmental statutes enacted since the 1960s include the Clean Air
Act, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 7401 et seq
(1988 & Supp 1993), the Clean Water Act, Pub L No 95-217, 91 Stat 1566 (1977), codified
as amended at 31 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1994), the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-516, 86 Stat 973, codified as amended at 7 USC § 136
(1994), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795
(1976), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 6901 et seq (1988 & Supp 1993), and the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16
USC §§ 1531 et seq (1994). See David Vogel, The 'New" Social Regulation in Historical
and ComparativePerspective, in Thomas K. McCraw, ed, regulationin perspective 161-75
(Harvard 1981) (chronicling the development of recent safety and environmental regulation).
t Pub L No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975),
codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 2301-12
(1994).
( Pub L No 92-573, 86 Stat 1207, codified
as amended at 15 USC §§ 2051-83 (1994).
- Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 1001 et seq
(1994).
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particular goals for agency regulatory programs and established
particular deadlines for implementing them. Finally, unlike their
predecessors, these statutes envisioned an active role for selfappointed representatives of the "public interest."3 6
As soon as the newly created regulatory agencies began to
promulgate the regulations needed to set these pervasive new
programs in motion, the individuals, companies, and trade associations that had opposed their enactment began vigorously to
resist their implementation. Unlike their tentative resistance to
the New Deal regulatory programs, the resistance to the civil
rights and public interest programs was swift and powerful. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all provided for interagency review of regulations issued by the major rule-making agencies."
These reviews provided opportunities for allies of regulated businesses within an administration (usually from the Department of
Commerce or OMB) to pressure the rule-making agency to soften
the rules or to allow greater latitude for considerations of economic and technological feasibility.38 Occasionally, the regulated
entities and their trade associations gained direct access to the
otherwise secret internal review process and presented their
arguments directly to administration policymakers."
As regulations began to emerge from the agencies, the forum
for industry resistance shifted to the reviewing courts. Virtually
every rule of any consequence was challenged in court. Applying
the "hard look" doctrine of substantive judicial review," the federal courts of appeals began to remand important rules because

'

See Richard J. Pierce and Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of

Agency Action, 59 Tex L Rev 1175, 1179 (1981); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667 (1975).
' The focal point for interagency review shifted with time from the Department of
Commerce, to OMB, to the Council on Wage and Price Stability, to an entity called the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group, and then back to OMB. See Thomas 0. McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality: The role of regulatory analysis in the federal bureaucracy 17-25
(Cambridge 1991).
' See id at ch 19; Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved)
Decisionmaking, 36 Am U L Rev 535, 539-44 (1987); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va J Nat Resources L 1, 40-71 (1984).
' See, for example, Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298, 384-408 (DC Cir 1981) (rejecting Environmental Defense Fund's claim that the EPA was improperly influenced by the
coal industry's "ex parte blitz"). See also Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L Rev 1059, 1068 (1986)
(suggesting that industry has input into OMB's decision whether to permit an agency to
begin considering a problem in earnest).
" See, for example, GreaterBoston Television Corp v FCC, 444 F2d 841, 851 (DC Cir
1970), in which Judge Leventhal coined the term.
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the agencies had failed to provide adequate reasons for their
resolutions of critical questions, because the agencies had failed
to respond adequately to comments, and because the reasons
given were judged to be arbitrary and capricious in light of the
data and analysis in the record.4 '
Hearings before sympathetic congressional committees also
provided forums for complaints about the stringency of agency
regulations and the unanticipated economic consequences of their
implementation. In response to the serious economic impact of
the new programs and the economic turmoil of the successive
energy "crises," companies, trade associations, and newly emerging conservative think tanks seized the mantle of reform and
proposed legislation designed to force agencies to think more
carefully about the economic impact of their regulations, to provide a statutory basis for the interagency review process, and to
change the substance of the regulatory statutes to "avoid a mismatch between a particular need for governmental intervention
and the regulatory method used to meet that need."42 Finally,
after several economic regulatory agencies initiated bold experiments in economic deregulation without any noticeable adverse
effects, Congress enacted legislation to eliminate some longstanding economic regulatory regimes.'3
Thus, by the time Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981, the
pendulum had begun to swing back toward the laissez-faire views
of the opponents of federal regulation; and with the election of
Reagan, the reformers scored a partial victory. President Reagan,
who could credit his election to an effective campaign against the
federal bureaucracy, made "regulatory relief" one of the four
primary goals of his "economic recovery program."" Packed
41 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 Stan L Rev

1189, 1295-1315 (1986); Paul Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va L
Rev 185, 206 (1974).
42 American Bar Association Commission on Law and the Economy, Federal Regulation: Roads to Reform 1 (ABA Exposure Draft 1978). The report of the Commission on
Law and the Economy became a key document in the nascent regulatory reform effort. Its
primary author, Harvard law professor Stephen Breyer, later published expanded versions of the report in the Harvard Law Review and as a book. Stephen Breyer, Regulation
and Its Reform (Harvard 1982); Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev 547 (cited in note 7). See also
Robert S. Smith, The Occupational Safety and Health Act 84-85 (AEI 1976); Eugene J.
McAllister, ed, Agenda for Progress: Examining FederalSpending ch 5 (Heritage Found
1981); Jay Van Andel and Richard M. DeVos, The Government versus the Entrepreneur,
Policy Rev 23, 28-32 (Fall 1979) (discussing "economic burden of excessive regulation" and

urging reform, including economic impact statements and cost-benefit analysis).
' See Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 1-28
(Brookings 1985).
" See White House Report on the Program for Economic Recovery, 1981 Pub Papers
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within the beguilingly simple call for regulatory reform, however,
was a broad range of proposals aimed at revamping the regulatory state. The most successful reform was the implementation
named the "regulatory impact analysis" requirement, a cognitive
regulatory reform aimed at changing agency thought processes. 45 Building on the regulatory analysis efforts of the three previous administrations, President Reagan signed an executive
order requiring all executive branch agencies to prepare a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative proposals for every major rule-making initiative. 4' When not inconsistent with the agency's statute, the agency was obliged to
choose the alternative with the greatest net benefits. 7 Subsequent executive orders required agencies to analyze "just compensation clause,"" "federalism,"" and "family 50 impacts of regulations.5
The Reagan administration also achieved certain structural
regulatory reforms-reforms aimed at structuring agency decision
making so that different institutional actors played greater or
lesser roles.52 President Reagan retained the interagency review
process and designated the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in OMB as the focal point. The executive order gave OMB
the authority to review all regulatory analysis documents for
compliance with the executive orders' requirements.5 3 A later
executive order gave OMB the task of coordinating all new regulatory initiatives and placing them on a comprehensive regulatory agenda.' The Reagan administration also created a highly

Pres 116, 126-29.
' McGarity, 38 Admin L Rev at 400 (cited in note 10). See also Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 Md L Rev 253, 256-60 (1986) (developing the
typology at greater length).
Exec Order No 12291 §§ 2-3, 3 CFR 127, 128-30 (1981).
Id § 2(e), 3 CFR at 128.
Exec Order No 12630 § 1, 3 CFR 554, 554-55 (1988).
Exec Order No 12612 §§ 1-3, 3 CFR 252, 252-54 (1987).
o Exec Order No 12606 §§ 1-2, 3 CFR 241, 241-42 (1987).
51 Furthermore, to meet these new analytical requirements, the agencies began to
hire economists and policy analysts capable of drafting adequate regulatory analysis documents, and these employees and their different ways of viewing regulatory issues were
over time absorbed into the cultures of the agencies. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at ch 1 (cited in note 37).
s' McGarity, 38 Admin L Rev at 400 (cited in note 10). See also McGarity, 45 Md L
Rev at 256-60 (cited in note 45) (developing the typology at greater length).
Exec Order No 12291 § 3, 3 CFR at 128-30 (cited in note 46).
Exec Order No 12498 §§ 1-4, 3 CFR 323, 323-25 (1985). See McGarity, 38 Admin L
Rev at 419-20 (cited in note 10) (summarizing requirements of Exec Orders Nos 12291
and 12498).
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visible Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by
Vice President George Bush, and charged it with resolving interagency disputes over proposals for new regulations and with
pressuring the agencies to revisit existing rules that regulatees
had identified as overly burdensome."
The Reagan era of reform was not without its failures. An
ambitious initiative by the administration and sympathetic Senators to codify the cognitive and structural reforms and to
strengthen the procedural and judicial-review requirements of
the APA died in the House."6 In addition, the administration's
efforts to achieve substantive regulatory reform-attempts legislatively or administratively to change an agency's substantive
output'--were surprisingly unsuccessful. The administration
initially pursued rapid substantive change by slashing agency
budget requests and appointing inexperienced administrators
who opposed federal regulation." The diligent efforts of some of
these appointees to dismantle their agencies generated fierce
opposition from the beneficiaries of regulation and their allies in
Congress. After several widely reported scandals in the EPA precipitated intensive congressional investigations, the administration quietly abandoned this "destroy from within" strategy. Furthermore, agency attempts to provide regulatory relief by repealing existing rules identified by the Presidential Task Force failed,
largely because courts demanded the same degree of analysis and
explanation for withdrawals of rules as for their initial promulgation.'

. See Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Reagan AdministrationRegulatory Achievements 2 (Aug 11, 1983) (on file with U Chi L Rev). See Thomas 0. McGarity
and Sidney A. Shapiro, Workers at Risk: The Failed Promise of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration 62-63 (Praeger 1993). Although quite active at the outset of
the Reagan administration, the Task Force gradually faded into oblivion during its later
years.
' See Regulatory Reform Act, S 1080, 97th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 29, 1981), in 127
Cong Rec S7938 (Apr 30, 1981); Regulatory Reform Act, Hearings on S 1080 before the
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong, 1st Sess 31-34 (1981) (summarizing the Regulatory Reform Act). The House declined to act on this Omnibus Regulatory Reform Bill, which the Senate had passed by a
unanimous vote. Diane Granat, ProbablyDoomed for Year: Rules Committee Fails to Act;
RegulatoryReform Stalled, 40 Cong Q Wkly Rep 3029, 3029 (1982).
', McGarity, 38 Admin L Rev at 409-12 (cited in note 10). See also McGarity, 45 Md
L Rev at 256-57 (cited in note 45) (defining "substantive" regulatory reform).
' See McGarity, 45 Md L Rev at 262 (cited in note 45) (Appointees "were aloof, politically unsophisticated, and to a surprising degree unqualified to perform their statutory
responsibilities.").
' See, for example, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
453 US 29, 42 (1983) ("If Congress established a presumption from which judicial review
should start, that presumption ...is not against safety regulation, but against changes in
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The pendulum swung ever so slightly further during the
"kinder, gentler" administration of President Bush. Bush's administration left all of the Reagan administration's cognitive and
structural reforms in place. In the area of procedural reform, the
Bush administration supported the first important statutory attempt to implement the much discussed but little used technique
of regulatory negotiation. 0 Under this approach, a regulatory
agency, prior to proposing and receiving comment on a regulation, invites "stakeholders" to sit around a table for a number of
days in an attempt to achieve consensus on one or more issues
that the rule making will have to resolve.6 The regulatory negotiation technique achieved some modest successes in reducing the
time and effort expended on a few relatively uncontroversial rulemaking initiatives, but it did not play a significant role in the
promulgation of any hotly contested rules.6 2 Early in his administration, President Bush created the Council on Competitiveness
to steer the agencies toward substantive regulatory reforms,"
but the strong willed and experienced individuals who headed
the important regulatory agencies generally held their own in
interagency disputes until late in the administration, when the
right wing of the Republican Party pushed the Council on Competitiveness to become much more intrusive."
The Bush administration achieved a degree of means-oriented substantive regulatory reform in the massive 1990 amend-

current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record.").
60 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-648, 104 Stat 4969, codified
at 5 USC §§ 561-70 (Supp 1994).
1 See Philip J. Harter, NegotiatingRegulations:A Cure for Malaise, 71 Georgetown
L J 1, 52-97 (1982) (offering a detailed proposal for negotiated rulemaking); 5 USC §§ 56170.
' See David M. Pritzker, Working Togetherfor Better Regulations, 5 Nat Resources &
Envir 29, 31, 51-53 (Fall 1990) ("[N]egotiated rulemaking [ I can be valuable to regulatory
agencies, regulated entities, and other affected interests."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke L J 1206,
1211-12 (1994) ("[Cjlaims of widespread benefits [from regulatory negotiation] are mostly
speculative.").
6
The Council on Competitiveness was chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, and it
employed as its executive director a young activist named David McIntosh. McIntosh was
elected to Congress in 1994 and has become one of the most avid regulatory reformers in
the House of Representatives. See McGarity and Shapiro, Workers at Risk at ch 11 (cited
in note 55); Memorandum to Secretary Martin, Department of Labor from the Vice President re: Regulatory Review Process (Mar 15, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (noting
involvement of Council on Competitiveness in regulatory review process and implementation of Exec Order No 12291).
' See Michael Weisskopf, "Outsider"EPA ChiefBeing Tested, Wash Post Al (June 8,
1992).
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ments to the Clean Air Act.65 The amendments established a
multistate trading program for sulfur dioxide emissions from
power plants66 and encouraged states to consider "economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights" in writing their implementation plans.67 The administration did not, however, seek substantial substantive
changes in the Clean Air Act or any other important regulatory
statute.
With the Clinton administration, the pendulum received a
slight push back towards active governmental regulation. Nevertheless, President Clinton did support and sign the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which requires agencies to prepare
statements detailing the costs and benefits of major regulations
and erects procedural barriers to the enactment of legislation
that would impose unfunded mandates on states. 8 President
Clinton also promulgated a new executive order that extends the
regulatory analysis requirement for major rules. However, this
order demands for the first time explicit consideration of a
regulation's equity and distributional impacts. In addition, the
Clinton order weakened the requirement that an agency select
the substantive alternative that maximizes net benefits. 69 A subsequently issued executive order requires every federal agency to
"make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations."7"
The Clinton administration has implemented few structural
reforms. Although it immediately disbanded the controversial
Council on Competitiveness, 1 it retained the interagency review
Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399 (1990), codified at 42 USC §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
42 USC § 7651(a)-(o) (1994). See also John E. Bonine and Thomas 0. McGarity,
The Law of Environmental Protection: Cases-Legislation-Policies586-87 (West 2d ed
1992) (describing regulatory program for acid deposition created by 1990 amendments).
6 42 USC § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1994).
68 Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48, to be codified at 2 USC §§ 1501-71.
' Exec Order No 12866 § 1, 3 CFR 638, 638-39 (1993). See Ellen Siegler, Executive
Order 12866: An Analysis ofthe New Executive Order on Regulatory Planningand Review,
24 Envir L Rptr 10070 (Feb 1994) (detailed review of order).
0
Exec Order No 12898 § 1-101, 3 CFR 859, 859 (1994). The executive order requires
all agencies to develop "environmental justice strategies" and provide reports on the
implementation of those strategies. Id §§ 1-103, 1-104, 3 CFR at 860-61.
" Clinton Administration Orders Retraction of Dozens of Last-Minute Bush Regulations, 23 Envir Rptr (BNA) 2571, 2572 (1993) (reporting Vice President Al Gore's January 22, 1993, announcement of the elimination of the Council on Competitiveness).
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process and continued to let OMB play the lead role.7 2 OMB
must also coordinate agency regulatory plans and publish an
annual comprehensive regulatory plan.7 3 As in the past two administrations, a prominent role is envisioned for the Vice President in resolving interagency disputes.7 4 The practice of interagency review, however, is more open and accountable than it
was in previous administrations. 7"
From a substantive perspective, the Clinton administration
has been more vigorous than the previous two administrations in
asserting the protective role of government,7 6 but it has been
singularly unsuccessful in advancing that agenda in Congress.
The administration has initiated several cooperative efforts in
which agencies have encouraged regulated industries voluntarily
to take action aimed at reaching broad regulatory goals.7 7 At the
same time it has initiated a comprehensive "Eliminating Regulatory Overkill" effort designed to examine all existing rules, and to
identify obsolete and ineffective rules and withdraw those rules
as quickly as possible.7"
If the pendulum had begun to swing slightly back toward an
active role for government in protecting its citizens, the 1994
elections radically changed the political terrain. The electorate

Exec Order No 12866 § 2(b), 3 CFR at 640 (cited in note 69).
Id § 4(c), 3 CFR at 642-43. In the Reagan and Bush administrations, plans were
published twice per year.
Id § 2(c), 3 CFR at 640-41.
5 See, for example, Meetings on Pending EPA Regulations Detailed by QIRA under
Executive Order, 24 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1478, 1478 (1993) (detailing OIRA disclosure of information on several meetings about pending regulatory matters between the OIRA
administrator and outside interest groups).
76 According to OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen, the Clinton administration believes
that "the government has the responsibility to govern, including the responsibility to protect the public, through Federal regulation when the American people-through our
constitutional representative process-decides that it should." Regulatory Transition Act
of 1995, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 34 (Jan 19, 1995) (statement of Sally Katzen, Administrator of OIRA).
" See, for example, DOE Plans to Seek Alliance with Industry to Help Firms Meet
Environmental Standards, 23 Envir Rptr (BNA) 2872, 2872-73 (1993) (reporting on
voluntary programs to meet Department of Energy and EPA environmental standards).
According to EPA Administrator Carol Browner, these programs are intended to
"deadversarialize" the regulatory process. Browner Says Cooperation with Industry Enhances Environmental PolicyDevelopment, 24 Envir Rptr (BNA) 322, 322 (1993).
78 Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better &
Costs Less 32-34 (US GPO 1993) (Initial Report of the National Performance Review). See
also Al Gore, Common Sense Government: Works Better and Costs Less 141 (US GPO
1995) (Third Report of the National Performance Review).
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retired several powerful proponents of the regulatory state, and
sent to Washington a group of senators and representatives who
signed or supported the "Contract with America" and promised to
codify cognitive and structural reforms and to initiate radical
substantive change in existing regulatory statutes. 9 Asserting
that "[c]urrent federal policies threaten the competitiveness of
American business, stifle entrepreneurial activity, and suppress
economic growth and job creation," ° the signatories of the Contract with America promised to enact legislation within the first
one hundred days of Congress.8 '
The signatories were true to their word. During the first one
hundred days of the 104th Congress, the House passed the Job
Creation and Wage Enhancement Act,82 which provides for,
among other things, neutral cost recovery and cost-benefit analysis,' the Unfunded Mandates Act intended to create jobs,'
and, for good measure, a moratorium on new regulations to last

' Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds, Contractwith America: The Bold Plan by Rep.
Newt Gingrich,Rep. Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation 131-35
(Times 1994).
8o Id at 128.
,i Id at 15, 18.
141 Cong Rec H2639 (Mar 3, 1995). The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act
was originally introduced in the House of Representatives as HR 9, Titles III, IV, V, VI,
VII, VIII, and X of which dealt with regulatory reform. HR 9, 104th Cong, 1st Sess §§
3001-5601, 6001-04, 7001-8209, 10001-03 (Jan 4, 1995), in 141 Cong ec H2607-29 (Mar 3,
1995). To facilitate separate committee consideration, it was broken into several different
bills: HR 830 (paperwork reduction); HR 925 (property rights); HR 926 (OMB review,
regulatory flexibility, regulatory analysis, regulatee rights); and HR 1022 (risk assessment
and cost-benefit analysis). After voting favorably on each of the separate bills, the House
then voted to recombine them into HR 9, which was to be called the Job Creation and
Wage Enhancement Act.
Although its supporters claimed that the House had passed the Job Creation and
Wage Enhancement Act in its entirety within the first one hundred days of the 104th
Congress, some important provisions were, in fact, abandoned and never became part of
the final version of HR 9. For example, the ambitious proposals for a regulatory budget
and a mandates budget in Titles IV and X of the original HR 9 did not survive. Other
provisions were deprived of all substantive content in committee. For example, an exceedingly foolish provision of the original bill would have entitled every target of a federal
investigation to prior notice of the investigation and to have an attorney or accountant
present at any interrogation. HR 9 § 8101, in 141 Cong Rec at H2618-19. As the Deputy
Attorney General testified to the House Judiciary Committee, this provision would have
"vastly expand[ed] the rights of criminal defendants" and hamstrung the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration in their investigation of
criminal conduct. Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, Hearings on HR 9
before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 137 (Feb 3, 1995) (statement of Jamie Gorelick,
Deputy Attorney General).
HR 9 §§ 2001, 3001-3301, in 141 Cong Rec at H2610-13 (cited in note 82).
HR 5, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H2209-10 (Jan 5, 1995).
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until Congress had a chance to revise or repeal the statutes under which the regulations were promulgated.' The House next
began serious consideration of comprehensive amendments to
many of the statutes that have historically provided the underpinnings for federal health, environmental, and consumer fraud
protections. When the legislative process began to bog down at
the end of the summer of 1995, radical deregulatory measures
began to appear as riders to House appropriations legislation.8 6
In the Senate, the pace has been much slower. The Senate
passed and the President signed the relatively uncontroversial
unfunded mandates legislation 7 and a reauthorization of the
Paperwork Reduction Act that extended OMB's authorization for
an additional five years and provided a goal of a 5 percent reduction in federally required paperwork per year.88 Although the
unfunded mandates legislation has the potential to bog down
agencies in cost-benefit analysis, it should be no more burdensome than the existing analytical requirements of the Clinton
executive order. The most important impact of the unfunded
mandates legislation may be to offer opponents of future protective legislation additional opportunities to impede its progress
through Congress.89 Likewise, while the Paperwork Reduction
Act reauthorization will make it more difficult for federal agencies to gather information, it should have very little impact on
the way agencies promulgate protective rules. The Senate also
passed a "report and wait" version of the legislative veto that
would give Congress the opportunity to enact legislation overturning administrative rules before they were implemented."

Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, HR 450, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 24, 1995), in
141 Cong Rec H2209-10 (Feb 24, 1995).
See, for example, House Appropriations Panel Backs EPA Cuts; Efforts Fail To
Strike Environmental Riders, 26 Envir Rptr (BNA) 593, 593-94 (1995).
s' Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995), to be codified at 2 USC §§ 1501 et seq.
Pub L No 104-13, 109 Stat 163 (1995). The Paperwork Reduction Act
reauthorization will have a potentially serious impact on the OSHA, because it explicitly
overrules the Supreme Court's holding in Dole v United Steelworkers of America, 494 US
26, 43 (1990), that OSHA was not required to obtain OMB approval of informational
requirements that it placed on regulatees.
' The unfunded mandates legislation establishes a procedure whereby any legislation that would impose requirements on state, local, or tribal governments of greater than
fifty million dollars in a single fiscal year (with some exceptions) will be subject to a point
of order in either house of Congress unless the bill also provides for federal funding to
meet the requirements. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act § 425, 109 Stat at 56-58.
' S 219, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 16, 1995). See Timothy Noah, Senate to Consider
Less Sweeping Bill On Regulatory MoratoriumThan House, Wall St J A2 (Mar 22, 1995).
Most versions of the legislative veto were declared unconstitutional in INS v Chadha, 462
US 919, 944-59 (1983). The "report and wait" version of the legislative veto eliminates
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As of this writing, however, the Senate has not passed omnibus regulatory reform legislation, nor has the full Senate agreed
to the moratorium that the House passed in the spring of 1995.
Although several Senate committees are studying comprehensive
amendments to the substantive regulatory statutes, only one of
any importance (telecommunications regulatory reform) has come
to the Senate floor. Like the House, the Senate has passed some
"rifle shot" riders to appropriations bills aimed at providing particular instances of regulatory relief, and a few have become
law.9'
Although the 104th Congress has enacted little important
regulatory reform legislation thus far, the second session may see
the enactment of omnibus legislation and specific substantive
amendments to enabling statutes. In any event, the bills that
have passed the House and nearly passed the Senate will serve
as models for future regulatory reform legislation. Thus, while it
is too soon to know which way the pendulum of reform will swing
in the near term, we can be sure that the regulatory state will
not go unchallenged in the future.
III. THE EXPANDED DEBATE OVER REGULATION
The radical assault on regulation in the 104th Congress has
had a powerful impact on political discourse. More frequently
than at any time since the first years of the New Deal, the debate over the proper role of government in society has been a
topic of everyday conversation. In many ways, the scope of the
debate is broader and the divisions in attitudes deeper than at
any time since the early 1890s when agrarian populists, radical
worker groups, remnants of the Liberal Republicans and Mugwumps, "single tax, followers of Henry George, utopian disciples
of Edward Bellamy and William Demerest Lloyd, academic economists like Richard Ely, laissez-faire apostles of Herbert Spencer
and William Graham Sumner, and spokesmen for the powerful
and entrenched banks, corporations, and trusts all debated the
future of the American economy. In this sense, regulation is
clearly at a crossroads. For those who study regulation, these are
exciting times; for those who feel unduly constrained by regula-

constitutional objections because it requires bicameral legislation signed by the President
to overturn a given administrative rule.
91 See, for example, National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 § 348, Pub L
No 104-59, 109 Stat 568, to be codified at 23 USC § 348 (placing a moratorium on certain
emissions testing requirements).
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tion, these are heady times; and for those who have depended
upon the federal government to protect them from the unconstrained exercise of private economic power, these are dangerous
times.
In the remainder of this Essay, I will attempt to characterize
five important positions in this multifaceted debate over the
future of the regulatory state and to outline briefly some of the
most significant points of friction. For purposes of illustration, I
will focus primarily on the debate over the nature of the employment relationship and the future of health and environmental
protection. In the process, I hope to illuminate some of the
choices that are available and to identify some of the pitfalls to
be avoided.
A. Radical Anti-Interventionists
The radical anti-interventionists agree wholeheartedly with
President Reagan's sentiment that government is not the solution-it is the problem.2 They therefore flatly reject nearly all of
the regulatory legislation that Congress enacted during the Progressive, New Deal, and civil rights-public interest eras. 3 They
unabashedly seek a return to the "golden age" of the last quarter
of the nineteenth century when business-oriented laissez-faire
reigned supreme in all three branches of the federal government. 4 The radical anti-interventionists are "conservative" not
in their desire to preserve existing institutions, but in their hope
of restoring the values and hierarchies that prevailed from the
end of the Civil War to the first one hundred days of the New
Deal. While seizing the mantle of "reform," they nevertheless
demand that the beneficiaries of the existing regulatory regime
justify the institutions and laws that protect them, as if it were
the beneficiaries who were seeking radical change. They rely
mostly on highly abstract and neutral-sounding theoretical arguInaugural Address, 1981 Pub Papers Pres 1, 1.
s I would place within the "radical anti-interventionist" category such writers as William F. Buckley, Richard Epstein, Milton Friedman, George Gilder, Friedrich von Hayek,
Russell Kirk, and Charles Murray. The radical anti-interventionist position is typically
advanced in such conservative think tanks as the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The description below relies primarily upon the writings of these authors.
' Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement 3
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1980). See also Julius G. Getman and Thomas C. Kohler, The
Common Law, LaborLaw, and Reality:A Response to ProfessorEpstein, 92 Yale L J 1415,
1415 (1983) (criticizing Professor Richard Epstein for taking "the 'common law' (in its late
nineteenth-century form) as the appropriate 'benchmark' against which to judge 'modern
statutory schemes'").
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ments for why laissez-faire represents the best state of the world
in nearly all contexts, and they insist that the beneficiaries come
up with similarly abstract theories to support government intervention. 5
1. Dualistic view of government and markets.
Most of the radical anti-interventionists view the political
economy in a rather clear-cut, dualistic fashion in which the only
alternative to a freewheeling capitalist system is a tyrannical,
morally corrupt, and economically impoverished collectivist system. Perhaps the most consistent theme throughout all of the
modern laissez-faire literature is the axiom that a government
that would preserve political freedom must also protect economic
freedom." As proof, they offer the horror stories of Russia, Eastern Europe, and China. 7 Centralized decision making is necessarily bad decision making, because bureaucrats can never stay
far enough ahead of technological and economic change to prescribe workable rules and regulations for all potentially abusive
or harmful practices in the private sector.9" In Hayek's frightening metaphor, once we turn toward centralized governmental
intervention to solve society's problems, we are headed down the
"road to serfdom."99

"' For example, Professor Epstein, in attempting to rebut the impressive demonstration by Professors Getman and Kohler that Epstein's view of the history of the at-will
employment doctrine was badly in error, responded that "it takes a theory to beat a
theory." Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 Yale L J 1435, 1435 (1983). See also Michael H.
Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 Yale L J
2767, 2775 (1991) (agreeing with Professor Epstein). This assertion is preposterous on its
face. To beat a theory about how the world works, it takes only reality. If the facts are
inconsistent with the theory, the theory loses its explanatory power (and the normative
conclusions that flow from the theory are thereby rendered suspect), whether or not a
better theory is available to replace it.
" This axiom is repeated in the modem laissez-faire literature too often to be captured in a single footnote of reasonable length. Two prominent examples are Milton
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 4 (Chicago 1962), and Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road
to Serfdom 88-100 (Chicago 1944).
' See, for example, Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom at 7-10 (cited in note 96);
Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 3, 54-57, 146-48 (cited in note 94).
H See George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty 26-27 (Basic Books 1981).
9 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (cited in note 96). See also Gilder, Wealth and Poverty
at 27 (cited in note 98).
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laissez-faire

The radical anti-interventionists not only strongly oppose
new federal regulatory programs, they also want to destroy most
of the existing programs. The securities laws,"° the wage and
hour laws,'' the employment discrimination laws, 2 and even
the venerable National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"' 0 ' should
all be repealed. Most federal regulation is, in their view, inconsistent with the three pillars of a laissez-faire political economy-private property, freedom of contract, and allocative efficiency.
The radical anti-interventionists tend to view private property in very absolute and expansionist terms. In what may fairly be
characterized as an appeal to natural law, they view property
rights as exogenous or prepolitical, existing apart from the political process and therefore not subject to redefinition by popular
government.' If modern legislatures may not appropriately define the parameters of property, where do we look for those definitions? For the radical anti-interventionists, the best answer to
that question
is the late nineteenth-century common law
10 5
courts.

1" See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, reprinted in

George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation 71, 81-82, 99 (Chicago
1975).
1"1 See Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 San Diego L
Rev 1, 54 (1994); Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 237 (cited in note 94).
1"2 See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 412 (Harvard 1992) ("It is now both possible and necessary to begin
with a blank slate."). See also id at 9 ("[Tjhe entire apparatus of the antidiscrimination
laws in Title VII should be repealed....").
103 See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for LaborRelations:A Critiqueof the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L J 1357, 1357 (1983).
1.4 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U Miami L Rev 3,
5 (1986) ("Political organization is thus best understood as arising out of a network of
forced exchanges in which individuals are taxed by the state and receive in exchange the
protection of the remainder of their holdings not taken by taxation.").
1o" See id at 7 ("If there is no central state already in place, the mode of acquisition
will have to be, as the older common lawyers had it, by 'natural' acquisition.").
At the same time that they would vest the owners of private property with expanded
powers to resist government intrusion, the radical anti-interventionists would greatly
narrow the concept of property to include those things (for example, land, chattels, incorporeal hereditaments) that were recognized at nineteenth-century common law, and few
others. In particular, they reject the notion that welfare payments made under governmental entitlement programs represent the sort of property that merits vigorous protection. See Epstein, 92 Yale L J at 1361 (cited in note 103) ("Welfare payments are never a
matter of a legal entitlement of the recipients, but only an expression of collective benevolence by the transferors.").
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The attitude of the radical anti-interventionists toward freedom of contract is most apparent in the context of employment
contracts:
The appropriate strategy in all cases.., is to open up markets to new entry as quickly as possible, to eliminate as
many of the impediments on the employment relationship-unemployment taxation, the minimum wage,
antidiscrimination law, most health and safety regulation-and to allow employers and employees to work their
separate peace on mutually agreeable terms." 6
The radical anti-interventionists are thus enthusiastic supporters
of the late nineteenth-century view that employers should have
the right to fire employees for good reasons, for bad reasons, or
for no reason at all.0 7 The radical anti-interventionists reject
the suggestion that unequal bargaining power justifies protective
labor legislation; employers must compete for good laborers just
as employees compete for good jobs.0 8 Indeed, the at-will doctrine is actually beneficial to employees, because "the employee
may not realize that it is best to quit a job to which he is not
suited and to seek a more suitable job." 0 9
Although the radical anti-interventionists are not strict utilitarians, they can usually find efficiency rationales for arguing
against government regulation. They cite, for example, efficiency
arguments for retaining the employment-at-will doctrine. Employees will work harder and produce more if they know they can
be fired for shirking their responsibilities. Employers will be able
to arrange production processes more efficiently if they have the
power to fire laggards and troublemakers."0

,0 Epstein, 31 San Diego L Rev at 2 (cited in note 101).
107 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947,

947-48 (1984), citing Payne v Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tern 507, 518-19 (1884),
overruled on other grounds, Hutton v Watters, 132 Tenm 527, 179 SW 134, 138 (1915).
10 Epstein, 92 Yale L J at 1360 (cited in note 103). See also Gottesman, 100 Yale L J
at 2771-72 (cited in note 95) (describing radical anti-interventionist position).
109 Richard W. Power, Defense of Employment at Will, 27 SLU L J 892 (1983).
11 See Jack M. Beermann and Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 Ga L Rev 911, 922 (1989); Epstein, 51 U
Chi L Rev at 965-66 (cited in note 107); Power, 27 SLU L J at 895 (cited in note 109);
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Will, 92 Mich L Rev 8, 21-24 (1993).
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3. Opposition to the modern regulatory state.
The radical anti-interventionists are fundamentally opposed
to most of the landmark legislation of the modern regulatory
state. They are not fond of collective bargaining and trade unions, and they would repeal or severely limit the NLRA because
it grants too much power to unions."' By forcing the cost of the
labor of organized workers to rise, labor unions both increase the
prices that consumers pay for goods and services and reduce the
demand for unorganized workers." The radical anti-interventionists also urge the repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires federal contractors to pay the prevailing wage, because
that rate is normally the union rate and the union rate is usually
inefficient."'
The employment discrimination statutes are also on the
radical anti-interventionists' list of laws destined for the dustbin.
Because they doubt that any employer who irrationally discriminates against qualified workers could long survive in a competitive marketplace, they are dubious about the potential for
antidiscrimination laws to bring about much social good." The
appropriate way to deal with bigoted employers is to attempt to
persuade them of the error of their ways, not to subject them to
regulations and lawsuits." Some 'radical anti-interventionists
are convinced that in many contexts, discrimination based on
race, sex, national origin, and religion is not irrational."6 Discrimination against women and minorities can minimize the
"governance costs" of controlling unruly workers who have a
"taste" for discrimination." 7 In addition, the high cost of acquir-

. See Epstein, 92 Yale L J at 1406 (cited in note 103); Friedman and Friedman, Free
to Choose at 229-42 (cited in note 94).
" Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 233-35 (cited in note 94). See Samuel
Issacharoff, ReconstructingEmployment, 104 Harv L Rev 607, 618-19 (1990) (describing
the radical anti-interventionist position).
11 Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 236-37 (cited in note 94).
114 See Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination39-55 (Chicago 2d ed 1971)
(describing the price employers must pay to satisfy their "taste for discrimination"); Epstein, 31 San Diego L Rev at 1 (cited in note 101) ("[Tihe best set of overall social outcomes would come from a legal order that tolerated any form of private discrimination or
favoritism, whether practiced by the most vicious and ardent white supremacist or the
most dedicated proponent of diversity or affirmative action."); Friedman, Capitalism and
Freedom at 109-10 (cited in note 96).
115 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom at 110-11 (cited in note 96).
", See, for example, Epstein, ForbiddenGrounds at 72-73, 266 (cited in note 102).
"'
Id at 60-69. Professor Epstein explains: "To the extent, therefore, that individual
tastes are grouped by race, by sex, by age, by national origin-and to some extent they
are-then there is a necessary conflict between the commands of any antidiscrimination
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ing accurate predictive information about future job performance
may lead employers to use broad "rules of thumb" in hiring that
are discriminatory in practice but enhance overall efficiency. For
example, radical anti-interventionists believe that since genderbased discrimination is normally based on legitimate biological
distinctions, it would be inefficient for society to waste its scarce
resources in forcing employers to treat women equally."' In any
event, they are convinced that any system of government regulation and enforcement of employment discrimination laws will
inevitably do more harm than good." Tolerating a few bigoted
companies will not significantly reduce overall job opportunities
for women and minorities who can always seek employment with
more enlightened employers. °
Occupational safety and health laws, in the minds of the
radical anti-interventionists, unduly restrict employer and employee freedom of contract and waste scarce resources. Employers
invest too much in training workers to allow them to be killed
and maimed for no reason. Workers will bid up wages for risky
work, thereby encouraging further employer efforts to install
safety technologies.'" And keeping workplaces reasonably safe
will reduce the number of tort and workers' compensation claims.
Hence, the best way to address workplace risks is to allow individual employees and employers to bargain over them, just as
they bargain over wages, and leave the rest to state workers'
compensation laws.' As Chicago School founder Frank Knight
observed, a primary distinction between laborers and company
law and the smooth operation of the firm." Id at 66-67.
18

See id at 271-72; Gilder, Wealth and Poverty at 128-39 (cited in note 98) (discussing

race- and sex-based "myths of discrimination"); Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction,
Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DePaul L
Rev 1021, 1021-22 (1992) (impliedly attributing such views to Richard Epstein).
m Epstein, 31 San Diego L Rev at 1 (cited in note 101).
"o
Epstein, ForbiddenGrounds at 72-76 (cited in note 102). Indeed, Professor Epstein
suggests that allowing bigoted employers to discriminate may be beneficial to the erstwhile victims of that discrimination. "If all the bigots and troublemakers are isolated in a
small number of firms, other workers have a more attractive array of firms to choose from
than they would if bigoted workers were distributed randomly across all firms." Id at 74.
1
See McGarity and Shapiro, Workers at Risk at 18-20 (cited in note 55) (discussing
economic theory that workers will demand a "wage premium" to compensate them for
risk); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace 3845 (Harvard 1983).
in See Robert Stewart Smith, The OccupationalSafety and Health Act, Its Goals and
Achievements (AEI 1976); Richard Zeckhauser and Albert Nichols, The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration-An Overview, in Committee on Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate, 6 Study on Federal Regulation (Appendix), 95th Cong, 2d Sess 161,
171-72 (1978).
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owners is that laborers have freely elected to risk their health
and safety whereas owners have chosen instead to risk their
capital.'

The radical anti-interventionists recognize that environmental pollution often represents a failure of the market in that the
polluter is allowed to externalize risks to the citizens of the community without paying for the privilege.' Nevertheless, they
would prefer to handle such externalities with the common law of
torts, by forcing polluters to compensate their victims after the
fact, or with flexible incentives such as effluent charges and marketable permits that are aimed at achieving pollution reduction
goals that pass a strict cost-benefit test."2 Other kinds of safety
regulation (for example, food safety and consumer product safety)
are less justifiable to the radical anti-interventionists. Since consumers can choose from among many competing products, manufacturers have a natural incentive not to sell products that will
poison or injure their customers, and the threat of common law
liability provides an additional incentive to design and market
safe products. Regulation does more harm than good by retarding
innovation on the part of manufacturers. 6 Therefore, agencies
like the FDA should be eliminated. 27
The radical anti-interventionist commitment to private property clashes directly with the claims of environmental
preservationists. For example, the radical anti-interventionists
are not at all sympathetic to claims that the goal of preserving
wetlands and habitats of endangered species warrant governmental restrictions on the use of private property, and they would
insist that the government compensate property owners for any
substantial diminution in value attributable to such restrictions. 2 '

See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 300-01 (Kelley & Millman
1957).
124

See Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom at 30 (cited in note 96); Friedman and

Friedman, Free to Choose at 31 (cited in note 94).
'25 See Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 31-32, 215-17 (cited in note 94).
126 Gilder, Wealth and Poverty at 239-41 (cited in note 98).
, Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose at 208-09 (cited in note 94).
'8 See Epstein, 41 U Miami L Rev at 12-13 (cited in note 104); Nancie G. Marzulla,
State PrivatePropertyRights InitiativesAs a Response to 'EnvironmentalTakings", 46 SC
L Rev 613, 623-28 (1995).
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4. Tolerance for large disparities in wealth.
Large disparities in the distribution of income and wealth
among the citizenry are of little concern to the radical anti-interventionists. Like Adam Smith, they believe that as individuals
pursue greater wealth in the marketplace, the wealth of the
entire society grows. Conversely, government-induced transfers of
wealth, whether effected directly through taxation and distribution of government benefits or indirectly through regulation, tend
"to reduce the overall level of social welfare." 9 The best gauge
of the health of a country's political economy is how well it treats
the rich. 30 Bettering the lot of the disadvantaged is a job for
churches and private charities, not the state.
B. Free Marketeers
The regulatory reformers in the second category recognize
that government can play a role in improving society, but they
are highly suspicious of most governmental regulation as implemented in the real world.'" Like the radical anti-interventionists, they prefer that the government not intervene in the market
except when it is playing its minimal role in enforcing contracts,
protecting private property, and specifying the foundational rules
for the marketplace. They recognize, however, that markets do
not always function perfectly and that government intervention
might be required to address market imperfections. Nevertheless,
free marketeers strongly believe that the market is the
benchmark against which all "corrective" intervention should be
measured, and they would erect a strong presumption against
government regulation.'3 2 In addition, they caution that regula-

' Epstein, 41 U Miami L Rev at 18-19 (cited in note 104). See also Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom at 172-76 (cited in note 96) ("Distribution of income is [an] area in
which government has been doing more harm by one set of measures than it has been
able to undo by others.").
" Gilder, Wealth and Poverty at 50 (cited in note 98) ("How the rich are regarded and
how they see themselves-whether they are merely rich or also bearers of wealth-is a
crucial measure of the health of a capitalist economy.").
"' This category may well encompass the largest number of current students of
regulation. It includes most neoclassical economists, most students of regulation in the
law and economics movement, and dozens of analysts in conservative think tanks and
government agencies. Prominent free marketeers include Stephen Breyer, Robert Cooter,
Robert Crandall, Christopher DeMuth, George Eads, Daniel Fischel, Robert Hahn, Lester
Lave, John Mendeloff, Daniel Polsby, Richard Posner, Charles Schultze, Richard Stewart,
W. Kip Viscusi, and Richard Zeckhauser.
" See, for example, Charles L. Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest 16-22
(Brookings 1977); Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules

1492

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:1463

tion has failings of its own and warn against "mismatches" between1 3market failures and the regulatory tools used to address
them.

1. Faith in the free market.
The free marketeers share the radical anti-interventionists'
faith in the free market as a fair and efficient vehicle for allocating scarce resources, but they lack the radical anti-interventionist moral commitment to property rights and freedom of contract.'" Economic efficiency is their guiding light. Free markets
are preferable to regulated markets because free markets are
generally more efficient. But free markets are subject to failure
for a number of reasons: consumers or workers may have insufficient information to make rational choices; companies may impose uncompensated costs or risks (externalities or spillovers) on
other private parties; or transaction costs, free riders, or holdouts
may render private bargains infeasible. When it becomes clear
that real-world markets are not functioning efficiently, then government intervention is warranted (and property rights and
freedom of contract may have to be sacrificed) to the extent necessary to correct the market failures.'35 Since government regulation can also lead to inefficient results, government should
adopt the least restrictive form of regulation capable of fixing the
market's failure to achieve an efficient outcome.'36 In short, the
free marketeers, unlike the radical anti-interventionists, have
made their peace with the regulatory state, but insist on the
broken-market paradigm as the primary justification for government regulation.
2. Cost-benefit test for governmental intervention.
The free marketeers not only begin with a presumption
against regulation, they also have in mind a particular test for
determining when that presumption may be overcome. Having
and Economic Efficiency, 38 Emory L J 1097, 1098-99 (1989).
" See Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev at 586-604 (cited in note 7); Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 San Diego L Rev 133, 134 (1994).
" See Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev at 552 (cited in note 7) ("[T]he assumption that an
unregulated marketplace is the norm does not rest on the adoption of a particular set of

values.").
" See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Md L Rev 86, 88-89 (1986) (urging
greater use of decentralizing, reconstitutive strategies to promote efficiency and innovation).
" See Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev at 586 (cited in note 7).
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identified an instance of market failure, proponents of regulation
must demonstrate that the social benefits of any particular governmental intervention will outweigh the costs.13 To the extent
possible, this demonstration must be made quantitatively using
models that use "best case" rather than "worst case" assumptions
and employ economic valuation techniques to express costs and
benefits in equivalent units (dollars, for example).'3 8
The free marketeer position goes beyond the widely accepted
cognitive reform of requiring agencies to prepare cost-benefit
analyses to accompany major rules for the purpose of informing
the decision maker and the public. The free marketeers would
employ cost-benefit balancing as the predominant (some would
say only) substantive decision-making criterion. Rather than
amending agency enabling statutes outright, the free marketeers
would repeal by implication all statutory requirements that are
inconsistent with the cost-benefit decision-making criterion.
Although recognizing that government regulation may be
needed to address the "externalities," most free marketeers are
highly skeptical of provisions found in many public health and
environmental statutes calling for agencies to adopt a "pollution
reduction" or "technology based" approach to standard setting."39
' Such statutes typically require the agency to divide industries into categories and subcategories, identify pollution
reduction technologies in use in the industry or available for
transfer from similar industries, and establish standards requiring a specified degree of pollutant removal. Cost and feasibility
considerations are relevant, but the agency must set standards
without regard to the benefits that their implementation will
yield. The purpose of pollution reduction standards is to ensure
that sources do the best they can to protect health and the environment, even if a detailed cost-benefit analysis would suggest

13

See id at 570 ("Ideally, one might expect regulators to set standards through the

use of cost-benefit principles.").
13
See, for example, Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, Pollution,Prices, and
Public Policy 71 (Brookings 1975); John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance
Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulationat OSHA 232-34 (MIT 1988);
Robert M. Solow, The EconomistsApproach to Pollutionand Its Control, 173 Science 498,
500-02 (1971).
" See, for example, Mendeloff, Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 172-73
(cited in note 138); Larry E. Ruff, Federal Environmental Regulation, in Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 6 Study on FederalRegulation:Framework
for Regulation (Appendix), 95th Cong, 2nd Sess 251, 252 (1978) (Best policies let technology and economics, rather than preselected environmental goals, determine discharge
reductions.).
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that less pollution reduction would be more efficient.' The free
marketeers complain that the pollution reduction approach requires "technology for technology's sake." They would therefore
repeal such provisions outright or by implication by enacting a
cost-benefit supermandate."
The free marketeers are also suspicious of statutes that require agencies to make public health or environmental protection
the primary goal and preclude or limit the role that cost considerations can play in setting standards." Failing to balance costs
against benefits will result in needless expenditures to reduce or
eliminate the "last ten percent" of the risks posed by environmental contaminants.' The free marketeers realize that statutes
that promise a "safe" workplace or environment may have important symbolic advantages, but these advantages are greatly outweighed by the practical difficulty in implementing them over
staunch regulatee resistance.' Pointing to cost-benefit studies
indicating that some federal regulations have cost tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars per life saved, they argue that
there must be some limit to the costs that society imposes in
pursuit of health and environmental goals.'
Some free marketeers suggest that "too stringent" protections
that fail a cost-benefit test may perversely result in real-world

'4'
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 L & Contemp Probs 159, 162-65
(Summer 1983).
.41See HR 9 § 3201, in 141 CongRec at H2612 (cited in note 82) (requiring agencies promulgating major rules to certify that benefits outweigh costs); Mendeloff, Dilemma of
Toxic Substance Regulation at 232 (cited in note 138) (suggesting cost-benefit analysis
would cure OSHA's problems of under- and overregulation).
" See Lester B. Lave and Gilbert S. Omenn, Clearing the Air: Reforming the Clean
Air Act 14-15 (Brookings 1981). For example, the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set
national primary ambient air quality standards at a level that will protect the public
health with an adequate margin of safety, without regard for the cost of attaining the
standards. 42 USC § 7409(b)(1) (1988 & Supp 1993). See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v EPA, 902 F2d 962, 972-73 (DC Cir 1990) (National ambient air quality
standards for particulate matter must not include consideration of cost of consequent
unemployment.); Lead Industries Association v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1150 (DC Cir 1980)
(agency precluded from considering economic factors when developing national ambient
air quality standards for lead).
" Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 11
(Harvard 1993).
'
See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233, 234
(1990).
" See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11-19 (cited in note 143); Martin J.
Bailey, Reducing Risks to Life: Measurement of the Benefits 26 table 4 (AEI 1980) (tables
showing costs of lives saved ranging from $37,500 to $624,976,000). See generally
Mendeloff, Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 21-71 (cited in note 138).
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protections that are in fact less beneficial than cost-effective
protections would be. Drawing on the frustrating history of
OSHA's attempts to promulgate occupational health standards,
for example, Professor Mendeloff suggests that "overregulation
causes underregulation." 14 Greater health benefits could be
achieved, he maintains, if OSHA would not attempt to protect
every exposed individual from all health risks. Rather, the goal
should be to protect a larger number of persons exposed to a
wider variety of sources of risk to a lesser degree. Regulatees will
be more likely to accept less stringent standards that are not
expensive to implement, and will be less likely to challenge them
in court. Courts in turn will be less likely to set aside standards
that impose only reasonable costs on regulatees.'47
In the area of occupational health and safety regulation,
most free marketeers would focus on information, rather than
protective technologies. Well informed employees will bargain up
wages for jobs that entail large degrees of risk, and employers
will take health or safety precautions when it is more efficient to
do so."4 When it is impossible to inform employees fully about
workplace risks, because information is unavailable or too difficult to communicate, the free marketeers accept governmental
standard setting, but insist that the standards pass the costbenefit test."
The free marketeers support the employment-at-will doctrine
on efficiency grounds. They believe that market forces steer employers away from arbitrary hirings and firings, because hiring a
bad employee or firing a good one will place the employer at a
competitive disadvantage. 5 ' As in other areas, government intrusion into the hiring and firing process is likely to do more
harm than good, if for no other reason than because it will entail
paperwork and litigation costs.' 5' Since employees will ultimately pay for increased job security with decreased wages, it
may not even be in the employees' best interest.'52 Since bigot'" Mendeloff, Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 8-12, 141-43 (cited in note

138).
'47

'"

Id at 219-27.
See Viscusi, Risk by Choice at 156-68 (cited in note 121); Mendeloff, Dilemma of

Toxic Substance Regulation at 212-17 (cited in note 138); Zeckhauser and Nichols, OccupationalSafety and Health Administration at 172-74 (cited in note 122).
"' See Bailey, Reducing Risks to Life at 23-24 (cited in note 145); Mendeloff, Dilemma
of Toxic Substance Regulation at 232 (cited in note 138); Zeckhauser and Nichols, OSHA
Overview at 170 (cited in note 148).
'' See Freed and Polsby, 38 Emory L J at 1098-99 (cited in note 132).
151 See id at 1127-30.
152 See id at 1102; Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Wew" Terminable-at-Will Employment
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ed employers who have an irrational "taste for separation" should
in the long run have a less productive workforce, competitive
pressures in a free market should drive such employers out of
business.'5 3 Thus, any persistent irrational discrimination must
result from market failures that allow bigots to shift the cost of
discrimination to the victims. Such market imperfections might
include the great cost of acquiring accurate job-related information and the inability of predictive models to predict future per-

formance of job applicants."

M

Although skeptical of statutes

strictly banning employment discrimination against protected
minorities, the free marketeers support limited employment discrimination requirements aimed at eliminating serious market
failures.
3. Market-based solutions to social problems.
The free marketeers also strongly believe that when government intervention is justified, the government should adopt regulatory tools that most efficiently ensure that the benefits of the
intervention outweigh its costs. Instead of "command-and-control"
regulation, they would recommend market-based programs, like
pollution charges and marketable permits to pollute.'55 Similar-

Contract:An Interest and CostIncidence Analysis, 69 Iowa L Rev 327, 336 (1984). The free
marketeers are, however, willing to entertain exceptions in instances where the benefits of
protecting employees from arbitrary hiring and firing practices clearly outweigh the costs.
Freed and Polsby, 38 Emory L J at 1104 (cited in note 132) (making "arguments ... in favor of paternalism" in cases where it will reduce employers' agency costs or increase
employee incentives). For example, they appear willing to tolerate some of the "public
interest" exceptions for employees fired for whistleblowing, voting, refusing to engage in
illegal conduct, or engaging in lawful union activities. See Estlund, 74 Tex L Rev at 166269 (cited in note 6) (describing the economists' acceptance of some exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine).
" See Becker, Economics ofDiscriminationat 20-21, 44 (cited in note 114); Cooter, 31
San Diego L Rev at 139 (cited in note 133).
'u
Cooter, 31 San Diego L Rev at 150, 157-59 (cited in note 133).
"'
See Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev at 581-82 (cited in note 7); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment,and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 9-20 (1985).
See generally Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation:A New Era From an Old Idea?, 18 Ecol L Q 1, 7-12 (1991); Stewart, 46 Md L
Rev at 104-11 (cited in note 135).
Under the pollution charge approach, the government might tax each pound of a
particular water pollutant at a flat rate (or even an escalating rate). The source could
then choose whether to discharge the pollutant and pay the tax or pay for the installation
of controls to reduce taxable discharges. An economically rational source would invest in
pollution control technologies up to the point at which the last dollar spent on pollution
control reduced the total tax by just one dollar. The level of pollution control achieved
would therefore depend upon the tax rate.
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ly, they might prefer what Derrick Bell calls a "Racial Preferences Licensing Act" under which the government would set targets
for integration along various suspect criteria (for example, race,
gender, religion, national origin) and allow employers to "trade"
among themselves in a market for discrimination."5 6
4. Antipathy toward centralized regulatory decision making.
Although not as dualistic in their view of the economic world
as the radical anti-interventionists, the free marketeers share
their fear of collectivism to the extent that they oppose centralized regulatory decision making. Like the radical anti-interventionists, the free marketeers are skeptical about the ability of
federal agencies to acquire sufficient information to write protective rules and standards. 5 7 When intervention is justified, it
should focus on the narrowest possible range of undesirable conduct and should be accomplished at the level of government closest to the regulated entities."=
5. Close management of bureaucracies.
Because they generally distrust bureaucracies, the free marketeers generally advocate tight centralized control over the rulemaking process. Justice Breyer, for example, has suggested that
Congress create a superagency, modeled after the French Conseil
d'Etat, composed of well educated generalists who would review
agency regulations under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard

Under the marketable permit approach, the regulatory entity determines the total
amount of a particular pollutant that may be emitted into the receiving medium and
divides that amount into discrete units. The agency then creates a new form of property,
sometimes called a marketable permit, that consists of the right to discharge one unit of
the pollutant. The initial distribution of marketable permits can be determined in many
ways, including, for example, an auction, a lottery, or a first-come-first-served queue.
Once the program is implemented, no one may discharge the pollutant except pursuant to
the rights evidenced by marketable permits. Marketable permits may be sold and purchased by entities that discharge the pollutant or by entities that elect not to discharge
the pollutant in order to reduce pollution. A discharger may therefore elect to install
pollution reduction technologies and sell its permits when the value of the permits exceeds the cost of the technology.
"' Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism 47-64
(BasicBooks 1992). See also Cooter, 31 San Diego L Rev at 148-49 (cited in note 133). As
an alternative to marketable rights to discriminate, the free marketeers suggest a tax
subsidy approach that would require "each firm to pay a tax on 'excess' workers of the
disfavored type and receive a subsidy for 'surplus' workers of the favored type." Id at 147.
"5 See Breyer, 92 Harv L Rev at 571-73 (cited in note 7); Stewart, 9 Harv Envir L Rev
at 20-22 (cited in note 155).
"5 See Alice Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream (Brookings 1992).
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of review. 5 9 Less ambitious free marketeers suggest structural
regulatory reforms that would institutionalize and to some degree intensify
the regulatory review function currently performed
160
OMB.
by
C. Modern Mugwumps
The recent search for substantive criteria to guide the exercise of governmental power has lead to a revival of "civic republicanism" in the law schools and elsewhere.' 6' That this term
means different things to different advocates is both a strength
and a weakness. Professor Cass Sunstein, one of its most prolific
and articulate advocates, argues that modern civic republicanism
is entirely consistent with the American tradition of liberalism
and should therefore be called "liberal republicanism." 6 2 Indeed, for Sunstein, civic republicanism is so universally encompassing as to be consistent with "certain forms of utilitarianism"
that "place a high premium on political deliberation, prize political equality, and do not take existing preferences and distributions as the basis for social choice."6 3 At the same time, "the
ideas of the New Deal reformation are highly compatible with
liberal republicanism."'6 Sunstein also finds liberal republican1 65
ism broadly consistent with pragmatism and Aristotelianism.
Apparently, many
tribes can comfortably gather under the civic
6
republican tent.
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 70-72 (cited in note 143).
16 See George C. Eads and Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory

Dilemma 99-105 (Urban Institute 1984); C. Boyden Gray, Presidential Involvement in
Informal Rulemaking, 56 Tulane L Rev 863, 864-65 (1985); Christopher C. DeMuth and
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075,
1080-88 (1986); Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President is No
Stranger,36 Am U L Rev 557 (1987).
161 Prominent civic republican theorists include Frank Michelman, Mark Seidenfeld,
Suzanna Sherry, and Cass Sunstein.
1
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1566-71
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L J 607, 612-16 & n 17.
See also Ackerman, 99 Yale L J at 484-85 (cited in note 11) (endorsing Professor
Sunstein's view).
16 Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 615-16 (cited in note 162).
1
Id at 617.
16 Id at 616.
16 Bruce Ackerman also embraces the possibility of a liberal republicanism that conjoins late eighteenth-century notions of civic republicanism with what he views as a
nonlibertarian strand of liberalism that rejects the notion of natural rights in property
and contract and "insists that the foundation of personal liberty is a certain kind of political life--one requiring the ongoing exertions of a special kind of citizenry." Ackerman,
99 Yale L J at 484 (cited in note 11).
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In their eagerness to adopt inclusive, centrist positions167
and in their hostility toward corruption in government, the new
civic republicans resemble the nineteenth-century Liberal Republican Party and, more particularly, the Mugwumps," who bolted the Republican Party to vote for Grover Cleveland in 1884 out
of revulsion at the loose political and business ethics of the
day. 69 Bearers of the civic republican tradition during the latter years of the nineteenth century, the Mugwumps hoped "to put
the national interest, as well as the interests of civic improvement, above personal motives or political opportunism."'70 But
they were also members of a "cosmopolitan and educated elite"
that stressed the values of professionalism and specialization in
public affairs.'7 1 They still believed in the sanctity of private
property,' and they were quite committed to the free market.'73 Like their nineteenth-century counterparts, the modern
mugwumps often see themselves on both sides of important substantive debates about the future of the regulatory state.
Although the modern mugwumps generally support federal
regulation to prevent abuse of monopoly power, to allocate scarce
commonly held resources, to secure equal employment opportunities, and to protect health and the environment, they are convinced that the existing adversarial approach to regulation has

" See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Gary Peller, New PublicLaw Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 Mich L Rev 707, 764 (1991).
1'
The term "mugwump" was borrowed by editor Charles A. Dana from the Algon-

quian Indian word meaning "great men," but it nicely conveyed the image of a person
sitting on a fence with his mug on one side and his wump on the other. See McFarland,
ed, Mugwumps at 1 (cited in note 22).
" John G. Sproat, "The Best Men": LiberalReformers in the Gilded Age 126-27, 13839 (Oxford 1968). The "Mugwumps" included college educated professionals from the
upper strata of the towns and cities of the Northeast and (to a lesser extent) the Midwest,
and "proper" businessmen like Charles Francis Adams and Edward Atkinson, along with
a smattering of ministers and educators. Some had been members of the Liberal Republican coalition; others were more recent recruits, most of whom, like Louis D. Brandeis,
came of age politically during the 1880s and 1890s. Their intellectual spokespersons
included George William Curtis, editor of Harpers Weekly, and British import E.L.
Godkin, founding editor of The Nation. See Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the GeneralWelfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought 1865-1901 49-51 (Michigan 1956);
Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny 17-19 (Knopf 1952); Richard Hofstadter, The
Age ofReform: From Bryan to FDR 137-39 (Knopf 1955); McFarland, ed, Mugwumps at 14 (cited in note 22).
170 Hofstadter, Age of Reform at 140 (cited in note 169).
'
McFarland, ed, Mugwumps at 9, 14 (cited in note 22).
1
Josephson, Robber Barons at 305 (cited in note 18); Sproat, Best Men at 9-10 (cited
in note 169).
17 Hofstadter, Age of Reform at 141-42 (cited in note 169); Sproat, Best Men at 8-9
(cited in note 169).
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failed. While the free marketeers grudgingly accept regulation,
the modem mugwumps often invite it in principle, but soon tire
of it in practice. On questions of cognitive and structural regulatory reform, the modem mugwumps align themselves fairly closely with the free marketeers, favoring liberal use of regulatory
analysis and careful scrutiny of agency rule making by OMB.
Only in the area of procedural regulatory reform do the modem mugwumps depart greatly from their free marketeer colleagues. The modern mugwumps generally favor broadly participatory administrative decision making of the sort that encourages deliberative debate among regulators, regulatees, and regulatory beneficiaries. Although very reluctant to position themselves
in debates over substantive regulatory reform, the modern mugwumps tend to side with the free marketeers because, like their
nineteenth-century counterparts, they are still devoted to the free
market paradigm.
1. Building a civic community.
In inviting full participation from the widest possible range
of citizens and in insisting that all participants pay careful attention to the views of others, the modem mugwumps hope to
reduce the level of alienation among citizens who do not share
the same interests and goals.'7 4 One of the strongest principles
of civic republicanism is that public discourse must be about the
collective interest and not about private greed. Modem mugwumps firmly believe that most citizens have a concept of the
public interest that varies (perhaps substantially) from their own
private interests. In civic republican deliberations about regulation, narrow appeals to protect existing companies from competition or regulatory burdens should be deeply discounted, because
the underlying motivation is private avarice. Arguments about
regulation should be about techniques that can advance the overall public good.'7 6

174 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105

Harv L Rev 1512, 1533-34 (1992).
"' Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1550 (cited in note 162); Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at
1536 (cited in note 174).
176 See Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1534-35 (cited in note 174).
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2. Commitment to a virtuous citizenry.
The modern mugwumps' high regard for civic virtue leads
them beyond the focus of their nineteenth-century counterparts
on political corruption to advocate an affirmative role for government in fostering a virtuous citizenry. To its proponents, civic
republicanism is an alternative to raw pluralism in which interest groups advancing their own economic interests vie for power
in the political and regulatory process. 1" Pluralism is open to
the possibility that "bad preferences" will prevail, and it accepts
without question "preferences [that) are formed against the backdrop of disparities in power and limitations in both opportunities
7
and information.""'
By contrast, the modern mugwumps believe that law can shape human preferences and not merely reflect them. "9 Citizens who participate in the political process
should come out the better for it, and not simply in material
terms. They should want better things for themselves and society.'s If popular culture has produced a lazy and uninformed
citizenry, it may be due to some correctable failure of the legal
regime. By regulating certain kinds of private conduct (for example, television programming and advertising), the government
can help citizens shed their self-interested self-delusions and
meet their civic obligations.' 8'

*' Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1544 (cited in note 162). See also Michelman, 97 Yale L J
at 1503 (cited in note 11).
178 Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1543-44 (cited in note 162).
1,9 See Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism and the Preference Problem, 66 Chi Kent L
Rev 181, 181, 203 (1990); Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1546-47 (cited in note 162). The idea
that law and politics can shape private preferences is not at all unique to the modern
mugwumps. See Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 748 (cited in note 167) (maintaining that a broader group of public law scholars than just civic republicans reject the
notion of exogenous preferences); David Frum, Dead Right 102 (BasicBooks 1994) (quoting
neoconservative Irving Kristol urging the state to take "a degree of responsibility for
helping to shape the preferences that the people exercise in a free market-to 'elevate'
them, if you will."). See also text accompanying notes 267-69 (position of unrepentant
protectionists on exogenous preferences).
" Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1537 (cited in note 174) ("By informing citizens
about others' conceptions of the public interest and by revealing to them how their own
conceptions might harm others, the deliberative process can help educate citizens and
unmask self-delusions.").
181 See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 113-14 (Free
Press 1993).
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3. Deliberative decision making.
Central to the modern mugwump vision of the good society is
the concept of "deliberative" democracy,'82 in which politics consists of enlightened debates among a broadly inclusive group of
well informed citizens expressing a wide diversity of views about
important social problems." Unlike the nineteenth-century
Liberal Republicans, who were inclined to exclude dissenting
voices from deliberations,' the modern mugwumps would urge
the majority participants to listen carefully to and empathize
with those in the minority. 1" The substantive result reached at
the end of the process is often not as important as the clarity of
the debate and fairness of the process.'
Self-interested positions "should be revisable in light of collective discussion and
debate, bringing to bear alternative perspectives and additional
information,"'8 7 and hardened positions should soften." If a
lack of relevant information prevents a consensus, the process
should be held in abeyance while more facts are gathered and
incorporated into the deliberative dialogue.
As more agreed-upon facts become available, the disputants
are more likely to reach an accommodation.'8 9 Ultimately, the
"transformative power of politics" will "enable[ ] the polity to
reach consensus about the common good."5' When consensus
proves elusive, the decision maker must give good reasons for his
or her resolution of the debate, explaining how the outcome advances the common good. 1 The losers can take comfort in the
fact that they received a fair hearing and can rest assured that
they can win tomorrow's struggle if their cause is just and their
arguments persuasive.

" Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1528-30 (cited in note 174); Michelman, 97 Yale L J
at 1513-14 (cited in note 11).
" Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 Harv L Rev 1303, 1303 (1994);
Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1528 (cited in note 174) ("[C]ivic republicanism embraces
an ongoing deliberative process, inclusive of all cultures, values, needs, and interests, to
arrive at the public good.").
Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1505-06 (cited in note 11).
'
Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 786 (cited in note 167); Seidenfeld, 105
Harv L Rev at 1534 (cited in note 174); Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1556 (cited in note 162).
18 Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 783 (cited in note 167); Michelman, 97 Yale
L J at 1526-29 (cited in note 11).
8
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1549 (cited in note 162).
See id at 1555.
Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 777 (cited in note 167).
""
Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1529 (cited in note 174). See also Sunstein, 1991
Duke L J at 613 (cited in note 162).
19' Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1529-30 (cited in note 174).
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4. Commitment to rational analysis.
The civic republican belief in deliberative democracy is reinforced by a commitment to rational analysis. If the republican
multilogue is only a policy debate about how society ought to be
arranged, then any hope for consensus will normally fade as it
becomes clear that the participants have widely divergent and
nonverifiable views about the answers to empirical questions that
are often at the heart of policy discussions. Although answering
critical empirical questions is always exceedingly difficult and
sometimes impossible, modern mugwumps are especially fond of
applying quantitative models to the bits of data that do exist in
the hope of reaching a tentative consensus pending the arrival of
new information. Thus, in the area of health and environmental
regulation, modern mugwumps tend to agree with the free marketeers on the need for cognitive regulatory reforms like greater
use of quantitative risk assessment techniques. 92 The modern
mugwumps also tend uncritically to accept the free marketeer
critiques of existing regulatory programs when they are backed
up with impressive quantitative tables and charts. Although they
probably know that such quantitative demonstrations are often
crafted out of whole cloth by persons advancing particular policy
positions (or even private pecuniary interests), they still rely
upon these impressive looking studies to support
their "neutral"
13
arguments for substantive regulatory reform.
5. Tolerance for disparities in wealth and insistence on
freedom from desperate conditions.
With some ambivalence, the modern mugwumps share the
tolerance of the radical anti-interventionists and the free marketeers for large disparities in income and wealth among the citizenry. 94 Such disparities advance three important republican
goals: "promoting liberty; providing incentives for productive
work; and rewarding and recognizing individual achievement and
excellence." 9 ' The modern mugwumps, however, believe that
each citizen is entitled to the basic necessities of life-"adequate

" See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U Chi L Rev 1, 72 (1995).
'" See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U Chi L Rev 407, 41819 (1990).
'94 Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 613-14 (cited in note 162) (IIT]he political creed of economic egalitarianism is foreign to the liberal republicanism of American public law.").
'95Id at 614.
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food, shelter, police protection, [and] medical care." 96 This commitment is very much at odds with the radical anti-interventionist position7 that private markets should allocate virtually all
9
resources.
6. Equality of opportunity.
The modern mugwumps believe that all citizens should enjoy
equality of opportunity, not only in the political sphere, but also
in their pursuit of private gain. 8 Although government cannot
guarantee equality of outcome (which would in any event be
inconsistent with the modern mugwump toleration for wide disparities in wealth), it can "ensure that education is available to
all," "design regulatory systems that promote awareness and understanding of public issues," and "create training and other
programs to give solid prospects to people born in average or
below-average conditions."'99 This right, like the entitlement to
freedom from desperate conditions, apparently flows from a republican commitment to broad participation by well informed
citizens in the great deliberations in the public sphere.
7. Limited commitment to the market as a benchmark.
Though denying the radical anti-interventionist view that
property rights are "prepolitical,"2 ° the modern mugwumps still
retain a healthy respect for the institution of private property as
a vital protection against governmental abuse and as a vehicle
for achieving greater prosperity.2"' Like the free marketeers,
the modern mugwumps believe that government regulation is
necessary primarily to fix broken markets. °2 The modern mugwumps, however, are willing to entertain the possibility that civic

Id.

"9

See text accompanying notes 129-30.
Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 615 (cited in note 162).

199 Id.

'
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1551 (cited in note 162).
201 Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 612 n 20 (cited in note 162) ("A liberal republican

would emphasize that private property is a creation of legal rules, rather than a
prepolitical right; but liberal republicanism certainly does not, for this reason, disparage
the institution of private property."). It is not clear whether the modem mugwumps would
join the radical anti-interventionists in refusing to draw a distinction between economic
rights and other human rights.
22 The free play of the marketplace, however, is subject to the previously mentioned
constraints that every citizen has a right to the basics of life and to an equal opportunity
to pursue wealth in the marketplace.
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deliberation will lead to agreement on intervention in at least
some cases in which citizens prefer to vote differently with their
ballots than their pocketbooks."'3
8. Cost-benefit test for governmental intervention.
The modern mugwumps share the free marketeers' affinity
for the cost-benefit test as a substantive decisional criterion, but
for somewhat different reasons. Rather than relying exclusively
upon efficiency as the rationale, the modern mugwumps find that
it nicely advances the sense of "proportionality" that derives from
general republican principles. 2 Rational cost-benefit analysis,
with its emphasis on quantitative techniques, offers the possibility of a "neutral" solution that reflects an appropriate balancing of
all the competing societal interests. Hence, the modern mugwumps would not allow health and environmental agencies to
require reductions in levels of human exposure to toxic pollutants
below some level at which the pollutants pose de minimis risks,
because the benefits of addressing those risks can rarely justify
the costs.0 5
9. Market-based solutions to social problems.
Like the free marketeers and radical anti-interventionists,
the modern mugwumps oppose "command-and-control" approaches toward achieving regulatory goals. 0 6 Beyond the free
marketeers' efficiency arguments against technology-based commands, the modern mugwumps worry that a system focusing on
obscure and arcane questions about the feasibility of particular
technologies effectively excludes ordinary citizens from the debate
and turns it over to special interest groups. The modern mugwumps therefore agree with the free marketeers and radical antiinterventionists that market-oriented techniques, like effluent
charges and marketable pollution permits,
are generally the best
20 7
vehicles for reaching regulatory goals.

' Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 621 (cited in note 162) ("[Plolitical action can and
sometimes should overcome existing private preferences and beliefs.").
2u Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 252-53 (cited in note 11).
2
See Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1583 (cited in note 162) (suggesting that courts be
empowered to declare invalid regulations that address only de minimi risks).
'
Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1575 (cited in note 174); Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at
627-29 (cited in note 162).
2N Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 629-42 (cited in note 162).
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10. Decentralized decision making.
Like the free marketeers, the modern mugwumps favor devolution of governmental power to small, decentralized governmental decision-making units,"' but they do so not so much out of
concern for efficiency as out of a conviction that republican deliberative processes work better in smaller communities.0 9 The
result, however, is the same-a general antipathy toward large
centralized bureaucracies.21 In the modern mugwump view,
large governmental units invite corruption and destroy social
homogeneity.2 '
11. Close management of bureaucracies.
Some modem mugwumps agree with the free marketeers
that Congress should grant broad authority to OMB to oversee
policy-making in the executive branch, so long as it is done in an
open and accountable fashion.2 " The president is elected by the
entire country and is therefore likely to take the interests of all
citizens, rather than parochial pressures, into account. Likewise,
the president is in the best position to coordinate public policy
and reduce inefficient duplication.'
Finally, presidential management has the greatest potential for "allowing the government
to respond to shifts in public opinion and decreasing the likelihood that politics will become routinized and heavily bureaucratized."214
D. Good Government Reinventionists
The good government reinventionists are firm believers in
the potential of government to solve pressing and persistent
social problems.2 1 Unlike the radical anti-interventionists, they
208

Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1578 (cited in note 162).

See Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter The New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421,
506-08 (1987).
210 An exception to this generalization may be Professor Seidenfeld, who argues
convincingly that federal bureaucracies are ideal fora for republican deliberation, because
they "fall between the extremes of the politically over-responsive Congress and the overinsulated courts." Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1542 (cited in note 174).
211 Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1556 (cited in note 162).
22 Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 452-63 (cited in note 209). Not all civic republicans
would assign a broader review role to OMB. Professor Seidenfeld, for example, cautions
against assigning too great a review role to OMB. Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1552
(cited in note 174).
213 Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 453 (cited in note 209).
214 Id.
215 The founding fathers of the good government reinventionists are David Osborne

1996]

The Future of the Regulatory State

1507

do not accept as a given the existing distribution of property, nor
do they agree with the free marketeers that allocative efficiency
is the primary reason for regulating private conduct. But they
recognize that governmental solutions require large and complex
bureaucracies. Applying what they call a "new paradigm," they
want to "reinvent" government to deliver important governmental
protections with a minimum of bureaucratic delay and red tape.
Like the modern mugwumps, they favor good government, sound
analysis of social problems, and market-oriented approaches to
implementing policy goals. They also share the modern
mugwumps' inclination to leave matters to private arrangements
entered into after the government has done what is necessary to
reduce market imperfections and to secure equal bargaining
power.
1. Better tools for better government.
In their search for ways to make government work better,
the good government reinventionists focus almost exclusively
upon procedural, structural, and means-oriented substantive
regulatory reform.216 Recognizing that the resources available to
address regulatory problems are scarce, they urge agencies to set
wise priorities using available quantitative tools.217 They generally favor information disclosure and consumer education projects
as alternatives to the costly and time-consuming rule-making
process,"' and procedural reforms to speed up internal agency
decision making and interagency regulatory review processes. 2"

and Ted Gaebler, but others were making similar points before Osborne and Gaebler
coined the term "reinventing government." I would also place in this category much of the
recent scholarly work of Donald Elliott, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Paul Weiler.
216 See David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the EntrepreneurialSpirit is Transforming the Public Sector xxi (Addison-Wesley 1992) ('The central
failure of government today is one of means, not ends."). See also Charles T. Goodsell, Did
NPR Reinvent Government Reform?, Pub Manager 7, 7 (Sept 22, 1993) (The phrase
"reinvent government" does not denote a substantive outcome, but rather "expresses a
generalized aspiration.").
217 See Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making 33-35, 76-82 (Carnegie 1993).
218 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ProgressiveLaw and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 358 (1988).
2' Gore, From Red Tape to Results at 41-46 (cited in note 78).
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2. Empowering citizens.
The good government reinventionists also resemble the modern mugwumps in their desire to empower ordinary citizens and
involve them in the governing process. 2 ' Hence, they support
procedural regulatory reforms like expanding opportunities for
public participation early in the rule-making process and reducing opportunities for powerful outsiders to affect the outcomes of
rule-making initiatives through closed-door sessions with the
staffs of the agencies and OMB. 22 ' But they also want to give
ordinary citizens more power over their everyday lives in the
private sector. Hence, they would limit, though not eliminate, the
employment-at-will doctrine that the radical anti-interventionists
find so appealing. Professor Weiler, for example, would require
an employer to have good cause to fire "career employees" with
whom the employer, over the years, has implicitly promised to
maintain a continuing employment relationship, 222 but he
would not require good cause to fire most blue collar workers who
lack legitimate long-term expectations.' z
3. Total quality management.
One of the prominent ideas of the good government
reinventionists is the notion that bureaucrats, like all good entrepreneurs, should attempt to meet the needs of their
"customers."" A regulatory agency's customers are the citizens
that the agency's regulations are meant to protect, not the regulated industries and public interest groups, and not even the
congressional committee staff or the managers in OMB. The
customer concept is meant to address directly the perception that
regulatory agencies are composed of arrogant bureaucrats more
concerned about their own turf and petty prerogatives than about
the public interest.

See id at 3; Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 19, 73-75 (cited in
note 216).
''
Gore, From Red Tape to Results at 38-39 (cited in note 78).
Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment
Law 102 (Harvard 1990). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Contractingfor Employment: The
Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 Tex L Rev 1783 (1996).
' Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 102 (cited in note 222). Compare Matthew W.
Finkin, Back to the Future of Labor Law, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 1005, 1012 (1991) (reviewing Weiler's Governing the Workplace and drawing white-collar/blue-collar distinction).
24 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 166-94 (cited in note 216).
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The concern for customers translates into "total quality management" ("TQM") within the bureaucracy. Under the TQM concept, "the customers are the most important people for an organization; those who serve customers directly are next; and management is there to serve those who serve customers."22 5 The TQM
idea has implications for structural regulatory reform. It suggests
that OMB should play a less constraining role with respect to
regulatory agency development and promulgation of rules. 2 6 It
also suggests that agencies like OSHA should allow regional
officials to experiment with cooperative programs that achieve
lower workplace injury rates without acrimonious wall-to-wall
inspections and citations for "nit-picking" violations. 27
4. Emphasis on prevention.
The good government reinventionists adopt a future-oriented
emphasis on preventing social problems before they become too
large to deal with in an efficient and effective manner.22 ' Rather than spending billions of dollars cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste dumps, the regulatory system should adopt pollution prevention programs to stop certain toxic substances from
being generated in the first place. The good government
reinventionists also support actions like EPA's phaseout of leaded
gasoline and efforts by several states and localities to ban polystyrene cups.Y
5. Rejection of the market benchmark
decision criteria.

and cost-benefit

When it comes to demanding that regulations be justified by
proof of market failure, the good government reinventionists part
company with the free marketeers and modern mugwumps. The
good government reinventionists recognize that government sets
the rules of the marketplace and that government intervention
may be justified on fairness, equity, or other grounds apart from

22

Id at 172.

"6 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive
Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 L &
Contemp Probs 167, 175-81 (1994).
Gore, Common Sense Government at 26-27 (cited in note 78).
See generally Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 219-49 (cited in
note 216) (describing and advocating "anticipatory government").
'See
id at 227-29.
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broken markets.23 For similar reasons, the good government
reinventionists do not insist that all important regulations pass a
cost-benefit test. Cost-benefit analysis is useful in identifying and
evaluating regulatory options, but ultimately the test should be
whether the option represents good public policy as reflected in
the agency's organic statute, not whether quantified benefits are
larger than quantified costs. Good public policy incorporates considerations beyond simple utilitarianism."' At the same time,
however, the good government reinventionists would demand
that regulations be "cost-effective" in the sense that roughly the
same resources should be expended to secure a nonmonetizable
benefit (for example, a life saved) in one regulatory context as in
another. 2
6. Market-based solutions to social problems.
Like the free marketeers and the modern mugwumps, the
good government reinventionists are generally opposed to command-and-control approaches to achieving regulatory goals.233
They argue that traditional regulatory commands are very difficult to write, are not always vigorously enforced, and usually fail
to affect the underlying incentives of the regulated entities.'
In the context of occupational safety and health, for example, the
good government reinventionists are convinced that OSHA cannot possibly acquire sufficient information to prescribe technology-based standards for every risky workplace, and they therefore
advocate greater use of collective bargaining and mandatory
safety committees in nonunionized workplaces.' Although the
good government reinventionists do not accept the unimpeded
market as the appropriate benchmark for regulation, they favor
market-oriented techniques that allow "public leverage to shape
private decisions to achieve collective goals."" s For example,
Professor Mashaw concludes that allocative efficiency alone prob-

See id at 290-92, 298.
Rose-Ackerman, 98 Yale L J at 344 (cited in note 218).
Id at 359.
' See Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 301-05 (cited in note 216);
Gore, FromRed Tape to Results at 11 (cited in note 78).
See Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 300-01 (cited in note 216).
Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 155-56, 181-85 (cited in note 222); Paul Weiler
and Guy Mundlak, New Directionsfor the Law of the Workplace, 102 Yale L J 1907, 191415 (1993).
' See Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 284 (cited in note 216)
(emphasis omitted).
"o
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ably does not justify forcing employers to spend large sums of
money on accommodating the disabled, but he still believes that
facilitating the participation of disabled persons in constructive
endeavors is warranted on other moral and economic
grounds."7 He therefore suggests a novel reinventionist regime
of quotas and marketable "rights to discriminate."2 "
7. Decentralized decision making.
Like the free marketeers and the modern mugwumps, the
good government reinventionists question the ability of large
centralized bureaucracies to regulate effectively. 9 In their
view, decentralized institutions are more effective, more innovative, more flexible, and more productive than centralized institutions.' Perhaps most importantly, they believe that people generally trust the units of government closest to them.2 4 Therefore, their rule of thumb is, "unless there is an important reason
to do otherwise, responsibility for addressing problems should lie
with the lowest level of government possible."24' However, they
concede much more readily than the free marketeers, and somewhat more readily than the modern mugwumps, the need for
federal leadership in the area of environmental regulation and in
many other areas in which the obligation to protect the public "transcend[s] the capacities of state and local governments.""4'
8. Close management of bureaucracies.
For the good government reinventionists, effective management is the way to get more bang for the taxpayers' buck. Therefore, like the modern mugwumps, they support central review
mechanisms (for example, OMB review) that exert management
control over the regulatory bureaucracies. They are more con-

' Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles,31 San Diego L Rev 211, 220-25 (1994).
Professor Mashaw very persuasively rejects the radical anti-interventionist call for the repeal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id at 225-39.
Id at 232-34.
See Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 11-12 (cited in note 216)
("Our thesis is simple: The kind of governments that developed during the industrial era,
with their sluggish, centralized bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations, and their hierarchical chains of command, no longer work very well.").
See id at 252-53.
241 See id at 277.
242

Id.

24

Id.
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cerned, however, with coordination to avoid duplication and overlap than with avoiding parochial power plays.2
9. Emphasis on voluntarism and negotiation.
The good government reinventionists believe that most citizens and corporations mean well and will attempt in good faith
to "do the right thing."2" Therefore, they prefer voluntary approaches in which regulatory agencies make public appeals to
regulatees to mind their civic responsibilities and offer some mild
positive or negative inducement to encourage them to adopt protective measures voluntarily." Voluntary programs are generally not designed to achieve specific regulatory goals or to induce
regulatees to behave in any particular ways. Their aims are usually to persuade private entities to change their standard operating procedures in ways that steer things generally in the right
direction.
Another favorite technique of the good government
reinventionists is the procedural regulatory reform called "regulatory negotiation." As discussed earlier, this procedure encourages
discussion and deliberation amongst the stakeholders prior to
beginning the standard rule-making process.' In a similar
vein, they advocate that agencies make greater use of alternative
dispute resolution techniques (for example, mediation, settlement
judges, and mandatory arbitration) at the enforcement stage.2
The good government reinventionists also offer governmentmonitored bargaining exercises in the private sector as alternatives or supplements to regulation. In particular, they would
reinvigorate collective bargaining as a tool for establishing
workplace practices in both unionized and nonunionized
workplaces. 9 Professor Weiler, for example, offers proposals to
equalize the bargaining power of workers and employers through
greater protections for, and increased awards to, victims of employer retaliation for organizational activities and strikesY
Gore, From Red Tape to Results at 32-34 (cited in note 78).
Gore, Common Sense Government at 33 (cited in note 78).
See U.S. Likely to Stabilize C02 Emissions by End of Century,Reilly Tells Committee, 23 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1113, 1113 (1992) (voluntary program to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases); 'Green Lights' PactsBetween U.S. Firms, EPA Could Cut Emissions by
235 Million Tons Annually, 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1705, 1705 (1991) (voluntary program to
reduce energy consumption and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases).
'7
See text accompanying note 61.
2 Gore, Common Sense Government at 95 (cited in note 78).
Weiler, Governing the Workplace at ch 4 (cited in note 222).
o Id at 233-73; Weiler and Mundlak, 102 Yale L J at 1916-20 (cited in note 235). Pro'"
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For nonunionized workplaces, the good government
reinventionists suggest that federal agencies like the NLRB and
OSHA experiment with joint labor-management committees as
vehicles for addressing disputes that arise in the workplace."
E. The Unrepentant Protectionists
Although much of the current political rhetoric assumes that
most of the regulatory programs enacted during the New Deal
and the civil rights-public interest eras have failed, those programs still have many defenders. Franklin Roosevelt and Martin
Luther King may be dead, but Ralph Nader is alive and well,"'
and statutes like the Clean Air Act and the Americans With
Disabilities Act still have many defenders in academia and in the
political world. I will refer to those who are prepared to defend
existing interventionist legislation and to offer additional interventionist solutions to existing social problems as "unrepentant
protectionists."'
The enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990'
and the Civil Rights Act of 19912 strongly suggests that the
American public continues to support government intervention as
a solution to social problems. The fact that very little protective
legislation is likely to emerge from the 104th Congress does not
imply that the civil rights-public interest movement is dead,

fessor Weiler concludes that the recent precipitous decline in employee participation in
unions has resulted from fierce employer resistance to unions, including flagrantly unlawful union-busting activities and "a few explicitly one-sided restraints on union organizing efforts" in the NLRA, "most ... traceable to the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947."
Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 111-18, 228, 233-41 (cited in note 222). See also
Weiler and Mundlak, 102 Yale L J at 1912-13, 1916 (cited in note 235); Paul C. Weiler,
Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U Chi L Rev 1015, 1016-32
(1991) (summarizing and defending the arguments made in Governing the Workplace).
21 See Ray Marshall, Unheard Voices: Labor and Economic Policy in a Competitive
World 156-85 (BasicBooks 1987); Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government at 263-65
(cited in note 216); Weiler and Mundlak, 102 Yale L J at 1922-23 (cited in note 235).
See Anthony Ramirez, Consumer CrusaderFeels a Chill in Washington, NY Times
Section 3 at 1, 10-11 (Dec 31, 1995) (describing Nader's recent work on consumer protection and lobbying reform).
'
As the reader has by now no doubt surmised, I would place myself in the unrepentant protectionist category. I would also include within the unrepentant protectionist
category Nicholas Ashford, Mary Becker, Derrick Bell, Cynthia Estlund, Robert
Glicksman, Oliver Houck, Mark Kelman, Howard Latin, Richard Lazarus, Zygmunt
Plater, Mark Sagoff, Sidney Shapiro, Jack Getman, and David Vladeck.
Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified at 42 USC §§ 7 4 01-7671q (1988 & Supp
1993).
Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 1981 et seq
(1988 & Supp 1993).
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though it does suggest that some retrenchment and re-examination may be in order.
To the obvious retort that relatively strong equal opportunity, environmental, and consumer protection laws have been on
the books for at least two decades without achieving significant
success, the unrepentant protectionists have at least three responses. First, the civil rights and public interest laws have in
fact succeeded. The civil rights laws have been effective in protecting women and minorities from invidious discrimination, 256
and the pollution control and worker protection laws have
brought about steady improvements in environmental quality
and worker health and safety.2

7

Second, to the extent that they

have not worked, the fault lies with the bitter resistance of
regulatees and their allies, and with the meager resources available to regulatory agencies that have made it impossible to overcome this resistance. To add insult to injury, in recent times,
Congress has reduced agency rule-making budgets while simultaneously increasing regulatory demands. 258 Finally, the unrepentant protectionists are convinced that beneficiaries of regulatory
programs would have suffered more if the country had adhered to
a nineteenth-century laissez-faire model, and they are confident
that a return to such a model would drastically exacerbate the
problems."
1. Importance of symbolic statements.
The unrepentant protectionists are very aware of the roles
that myth and symbolism play in governance. They agree with
the modern mugwumps that civic debate can reorder private
preferences, but they place more faith in the power of symbolic
action than in reasoned dialogue. The "million man march" on
Washington, D.C., for example, was not about dialogue, nor was
it merely an attempt by an interest group to pressure a reluctant

See Weiler and Mundlak, 102 Yale L J at 1915 (cited in note 235).
See Gregg Easterbrook, A Moment on Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental
Optimism xdii-xv, 471-72 (Viking 1995) ("Environmental protection is the leading success
story of postwar liberalism."). The unrepentant protectionists find the modern mugwumps
far too willing to accept at face value studies by free marketeers purporting to demonstrate that "regulation has imposed enormously high costs for speculative benefits" and
that "regulation has sometimes aggravated the very problem that it was designed to
solve." Sunstein, 1991 Duke L J at 625 (cited in note 162).
See Greider, Who Will Tell the People at 109-22 (cited in note 24).
See Nancy E. Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality: In Defense of Privileged White Males, 34
Wm & Mary L Rev 429, 482 (1993).

1996]

The Future of the Regulatory State

1515

Congress into giving it a larger slice of the economic pie. It was
intended to make a powerful symbolic appeal to African-American men to take greater responsibility for themselves and the
people they love and to broadcast a similar symbolic message to
the general public that African-American men demand greater
respect from their communities.
The strong concern that unrepentant protectionists have for
the role that symbolism can play in shaping public attitudes
leads them to oppose some market-oriented strategies.2 6 For
example, unrepentant protectionists are sometimes heard to
complain that a system of effluent charges to reduce water pollution merely grants companies a "license to pollute."2 61 Similarly,
unrepentant protectionists oppose suggestions that companies be
allowed to establish a market in "rights to discriminate" against
the disabled, even when the market would function only to reallocate mandatory hiring quotas.2 6 Although it is possible that
such a vehicle would waste far fewer resources than a statute
that simply required all employers to take reasonable steps toward accommodating the disabled, the symbolic message that the
ability to avoid associating with disabled people was on sale to
the highest bidder (or that the disabled would find employment
only with those least able to afford the price of being rid of them)
would constitute a powerful negative statement about society's
regard for persons with disabilities.
2. Narrow view of property rights.
The unrepentant protectionists deny the radical anti-interventionist position that property rights are prepolitical and that
historical inequities in the distribution of property are best left
undisturbed.6 Since government defined those rights initially,
government can redefine those rights if necessary to protect some
of its citizens or commonly shared resources from the destructive
activities of others. The fact that the common law courts of the

26

See Steven Kelman, What Price Incentives?: Economists and the Environment 27

(Auburn House 1981).
261 Id at 44-46.
2
See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's FinancialHardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 48 Vand L Rev 391, 399 n 26 (1995) ("Professor Mashaw's solution of bartering
employment of disabled workers for cash harkens back to a day when slaves were auctioned at the public square.").
2" See Lawrence C. Becker, Rent Control is Not a Taking, 54 Brooklyn L Rev 1215,
1216 (1989) (critiquing Professor Epstein's anti-interventionist position).
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late nineteenth century recognized a landowner's right to destroy
the habitat of endangered species is, in their view, no reason to
insist that any late twentieth-century limitation on those rights
is a compensable taking."' They are not persuaded by the radical anti-interventionists that government interference with property rights will automatically put all human
rights at risk.265
266
rights.
property
Times change, and so do
3. Rejection of the market benchmark.
The unrepentant protectionists do not agree with the radical
anti-interventionists and the free marketeers that the broken
market rationale is the only appropriate basis for government
intervention. Like the modern mugwumps, they reject the assumption that individual preferences expressed in the marketplace are exogenous to the social and political context.6 7 Consumer preferences may govern markets, but the institutions that
shape those preferences include the family, the school, the
church, the entertainment industry, the mass media, and (primarily through the latter two vehicles) the marketplace itself.
While the marketplace shapes preferences, the public sector
shapes the preferences that are reflected in the marketplace. Law
therefore has a role to play in bringing about a just society because law played a role in bringing about the injustices.2 66
The unrepentant protectionists further refuse to adopt economic freedom and efficiency as "meta-values" that effectively
trump all other values in public policy-making. Concern for the
welfare of endangered species or for future generations of humans cannot be captured in a regulatory system in which maximizing economic efficiency is the primary goal.269 Similarly, the
radical anti-interventionists' devotion to economic freedom and
the free marketeers' commitment to economic efficiency belittle
the concerns for fairness and equality of opportunity that under-

24 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U Chi L Rev 279, 289-91 (1986).
26 See Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the

Individual Through the Collective Pursuitof EnvironmentalQuality, 77 Iowa L Rev 1739,
1756-57 (1992).
See Becker, 54 Brooklyn L Rev at 1216 (cited in note 263).
Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 748, 778 (cited in note 167).
Id at 748, 777.
26 See Mark Sagoff, The Principlesof FederalPollution Control Law, 71 Minn L Rev
19, 55-68 (1986).
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lie fair employment laws."' If necessary, efficiency must suffer
in order that society may be more diverse and open.
4. Predisposition toward protection.
The unrepentant protectionists believe that Congress enacted
most regulatory statutes to protect some citizens from the adverse consequences of the profit-maximizing activities of corporations and other citizens. In the context of the employment relationship, the unrepentant protectionists stress the reality of unequal bargaining power.271 Employees who have faithfully
worked for years at a job deserve more than a brief citation to
the nineteenth-century employment-at-will doctrine when a corporate rearrangement results in the elimination of their jobs.
Fairness demands more than a pink slip when a supervisor decides that he just doesn't like an employee's attitude. To recognize an employer's right to fire an employee for bad reasons or no
reason at all is to ignore the investment of time that the employee has made in the company, the enormous consequences of a job
loss in a society in which a job is a source of pride and social
acceptance,272 and a political economy in which unemployment
rates play second fiddle to inflation rates. Employment-at-will
may also hinder productivity by turning employees into automatons who are afraid to make useful suggestions for changing
workplace practices.2 73 The unrepentant protectionists would
therefore support legislation that repeals the employment-at-will
doctrine by denying employers the right to fire certain long-term
employees without good cause.

27

See Marion Crain, Rationalizing Inequality: An Antifeminist Defense of the "Free"

Market-A Review of Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination
Laws, 61 Geo Wash L Rev 556, 562-68 (1993).
"' See Getman and Kohler, 92 Yale L J at 1421-22 (cited in note 94) (arguing that it
is not useful to view bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment as if it
consisted of a single individual dealing with another when, in the absence of collective
bargaining, it is in reality a single individual dealing with the economic power of a corporate entity); Schwab, 92 Mich L Rev at 29 (cited in note 110).
See Beermann and Singer, 23 Ga L Rev at 917, 929-31 (cited in note 110); Mary
Ann Glendon and Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship:An Essay on the New Property, 20 BC L Rev 457, 483 (1979).
See Beermann and Singer, 23 Ga L Rev at 928 (cited in note 110).
"
See, for example, Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va L Rev 481, 519-32 (1976) (proposing a statute). Although
the suggestions vary, such laws would at their core empower employees who are about to
be fired to demand a hearing before a neutral decision maker (such as an administrative
law judge or an independent arbitrator) and would require the employer to establish that
it had good cause to terminate the employment relationship. See Estlund, 74 Tex L Rev at
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Also high on the unrepentant protectionist agenda is the goal
of eliminating the embeddedness of race and sex discrimination
in the workplace.275 Real world stories of the lives of people who
regularly suffer the indignities of invidious discrimination belie
the benign reassurances of the free marketeers that market forces will bring about the gradual "withering away" of invidious
race and sex discrimination.276 Unrepentant protectionists contend that the radical anti-interventionists' claims that biological
differences justify employer use of sex as an efficient sorting
mechanism are morally and practically wrong.277 Even assuming that laws requiring employers to accommodate people with
disabilities operate in practice to redistribute wealth from consumers and shareholders to the disabled, they contend that a
society in which people with disabilities may participate productively is worth the cost in lost allocative efficiency.27 Troubled
by the prospect of a highly differentiated and increasingly hostile
society, they believe that government prohibition of employment
discrimination will foster greater communication and understanding among people of different races, religions, sexual preferences, and so on. 79
For the unrepentant protectionist, inequality of bargaining
power also explains why information and bargaining alone can-

1682-86 (cited in note 6); Alan Hyde, EndangeredSpecies, 91 Colum L Rev 456, 460-61 &
n 15 (1991).
See Dowd, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 481 (cited in note 259).
26 See, for example, Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well at 65-66 (cited in note 156);
Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law Professor,6
Berkeley Women's L J 46, 49-55 (1990-91); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative,87 Mich L Rev 2411 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda, Voices
ofAmerica: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 Yale L J 1329, 1333-48 (1991) (recounting "stories" of discrimination); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title WI Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv
L Rev 1749, 1799-1815 (1990).
In the view of the unrepentant protectionists, the radical anti-interventionists who
believe that market forces will cause discrimination to "wither away" simplistically avoid
the ubiquitous case in which the person discriminated against is one of a large number of
otherwise equally endowed individuals. For example, discrimination against AfricanAmericans in hiring janitors will cost the employer very little in efficiency losses if there
are hundreds of white applicants for the position.
'
Mary E. Becker, BarriersFacing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need
for AdditionalRemedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U Chi L Rev 934 (1986); Joan
C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich L Rev 797 (1989).
28 See, for example, Tom Harkin, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Four Years
Later-A Commentary on Blanck, 79 Iowa L Rev 935, 935, 939 (1994).
2"9 See Crain, 61 Geo Wash L Rev at 565 (cited in note 270); Matsuda, 100 Yale L J at
1403-06 (cited in note 276).
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not yield the right amount of occupational safety and health
protection. For most dangerous industrial jobs, the annualized
costs of significant workplace protections are much greater than
any individual employee's salary. Thus, it is utterly naive to
suggest that migrant field workers or nonunion minimum wage
laborers can obtain adequate health and safety protections
through individual negotiations over the terms and conditions of
employment. Furthermore, these employees are part of a group
that does not have the option to vote with their feet by choosing
safer jobs.
In the areas of both occupational health and pollution control, the unrepentant protectionists distinguish between two basic
approaches to attaining overall goals: (1) identifying some measurable indicia of adequate protection (or acceptable risk of
harm) and requiring (or inducing) regulatees to take whatever
measures are necessary to achieve that level of protection; and
(2) identifying the protective measures that are available and
requiring (or inducing) regulatees to adopt such measures (or
equivalent measures) without regard to whether those measures
by themselves will achieve an adequate level of protection.28 °
The unrepentant protectionists generally prefer a combination of
the two approaches with the media quality approach serving as a
backup to the pollution reduction approach. In implementing the
first approach (the media quality approach), unrepentant protectionists do not generally demand absolute protection (that is,
zero risk of harm), but they do insist on a margin of safety as a
hedge against uncertainties and they prefer that cost and feasibility considerations play no role whatsoever in determining the
level of adequate protection.28 ' Rejecting as largely irrelevant
the free marketeer argument that the second approach (the pollution reduction approach) wastefully requires "technology for
technology's sake," the unrepentant protectionists observe that it
is a good deal easier to implement and note that the nation's
environmental statutes have generally evolved in the direction of
greater reliance on that approach.28 2

See McGarity, 46 L & Contemp Probs at 162-65 (cited in note 140).
See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, 824 F2d 1146,
1152-54 (DC Cir 1987) (en banc) (interpreting meaning of "ample margin of safety" in the
context of national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants).
' See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and 'Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1304-31
(1985); McGarity, 46 L & Contemp Probs at 203, 206-09 (cited in note 140).
'8
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The unrepentant protectionists resent the modern mugwump
suggestion that calls for more stringent health and environmental regulations are merely special interest pleadings that must be
ignored unless justified by reference to some commonly agreed
upon measure of the public interest." They strongly agree with
the modern mugwumps that special interests disproportionately
influence public policy,2" but they do not agree that representatives of consumer, environmental, civil rights, and other public
interest groups are equivalent to lobbyists from the National Association of Manufacturers or the Chamber of Commerce. Furthermore, the mugwumps' devotion to the commonly derived
public interest is undermined by their invitation to reviewing
courts to graft de minimis exceptions on health and environmental legislation.2" To the unrepentant protectionist, this suggests
that the reviewing judge may substitute his or her own policy
preferences for those of the legislature upon concluding that a
duly deliberative legislature could not possibly have enacted the
statute. This arrogates far too much power to the unelected judiciary and, by implication, to the "great men" who opine in neutral-sounding terms about the substantive principles that should
guide the exercise of governmental power.
5. Respect
analysis.

for uncertainty and rejection of cost-benefit

The unrepentant protectionists have a healthy respect for
uncertainty and a corresponding distrust of cost-benefit analysis." 6 Recognizing that quantitative risk assessment can assist
agencies in establishing priorities, the unrepentant protectionists
believe that too many uncertainties becloud existing risk-assessment models to recommend them as tools for use in establishing

See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 267 (cited in note 11) (describing two classic battles
over environmental policy as "interest-group maneuvering").
See Greider, Who Will Tell the People at 141-58 (cited in note 24).
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1583 (cited in note 162).
See National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process 11-12 (National Academy 1983) ('The dominant analytic difficulty
[in agency decisions] is pervasive uncertainty."); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 Colum L
Rev 261, 264-66 (1991); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics,and the Management of Toxic
Risks ThroughLaw, 30 JurimetJ 271,276-91 (1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, BadRegulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 Yale J Reg 89, 147-48 (1988) (noting that cost-benefit
analysis is "fundamentally dependent on the quality of regulatory risk assessments");
James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 Harv Envir L Rev 86, 100-103 (1980).

1996]

The Future of the Regulatory State

1521

de minimis levels of risk or in undertaking quantitative costbenefit analysis. First, policy plays a large role in determining
the assumptions and inferences that go into mathematical representations of reality. Professional practitioners of risk assessment
tend to "dwarf soft variables" like emotional distress and concern
for well-being of endangered species." 7 Unrepentant protectionists particularly object to reductionist attempts to assign a dollar
value to the benefits of environmental regulation, such as the
saving of human lives and endangered species." Furthermore,
advocates of replacing "worst case" assumptions with "best case"
assumptions are often advancing a hidden agenda of achieving
less regulation, rather than better regulation.2 89 Having acknowledged uncertainty, unrepentant protectionists remain suspicious of comparative risk assessment as a vehicle for putting
particular regulatory initiatives in perspective.9 Finally, because risk assessment is generally inaccessible to ordinary citizens, the unrepentant protectionists bemoan the inclination of
free marketeers and modern mugwumps to dismiss the legitimate fears of ordinary people who are actually exposed to
risk.29 ' When honestly undertaken, a cost-benefit analysis for a

' See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil & Pub Aff 66,
95-97 (1972); Richard N.L. Andrews, Cost Benefit Analysis As Regulatory Reform, in
Daniel Swartzman, Richard A. Liroff, and Kevin G. Croke, eds, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Environmental Regulations: Politics,Ethics, and Methods 107, 123 (Conservative Found
1982).
'
See Susan J. Tolchin and Martin Tolchin, Dismantling America: The Rush to
Deregulate 128-37 (Houghton Mifflin 1983); J.G.U. Adams,... and how much for your
grandmother, 6 Envir & Planning 619, 619-25 (1974); Baruch Fischhoff, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, 8 Policy Sciences 177, 185-87 (1977);
Steven Kelman, Cost Benefit Analysis and Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation:
Ethical and PhilosophicalConsiderations,in Daniel Swartzman, Richard A. Liroff, and
Kevin G. Croke, eds, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations: Politics,
Ethics, and Methods 137, 140 (Conservative Found 1982). See also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U Chi L Rev 63, 68-73 (1990) (criticizing
the Kaldor-Hicks measure of allocative efficiency).
' See, for example, Latin, 5 Yale J Reg at 93 (cited in note 286) ("The illusion that
risk assessment is a purely scientific activity reduces the visibility and political accountability of policy judgments ... ."); National Research Council, Risk Assessment at 33-37
(cited in note 286) (identifying more than forty decision points in a typical risk assessment at which the risk assessor must exercise some degree of scientific judgment);
Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in AdministrativeResolution
of Science Policy Questions:Regulating Carcinogensin EPA and OSHA, 67 Georgetown L
J 729, 793-96 (1979) (noting that agency decisions are often political rather than scientific).
'o See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
ComparativeRisk Analysis, 92 Colum L Rev 562, 563-65, 629-33 (1992).
291 See David Bollier and Joan Claybrook, Freedom From Harm: The CivilizingInfluence of Health, Safety and EnvironmentalRegulation 200-01 (Public Citizen & Democracy
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complex rule making can at best present a range of alternatives,
any one of which might or might not pass the cost-benefit test.
The unrepentant protectionists also believe that cost-benefit
analysis is deaf to distributional considerations. The differential
impact that a regulation can have on different age groups and on
the rich and poor are irrelevant to a cost-benefit analysis of that
regulation.29 2 Yet distributional concerns are precisely what
have inspired Congress to enact the protections afforded by the
civil rights laws and to establish stringent media quality standards to protect sensitive populations.29 The unrepentant protectionists complain that cost-benefit analysis can make regulatory actions based primarily upon distributional considerations
appear irrational and thereby provide a basis for avoiding their implementation. 4
The unrepentant protectionists reject the free marketeers'
contention that protections that fail to meet the cost-benefit criterion may perversely provide fewer protections than less stringent
protections that do meet the cost-benefit test. 5 This thesis was
severely undermined by the fate of OSHA's ambitious attempt to
promulgate "lite" standards for about four hundred air contaminants in the late 1980s. Although OSHA consciously attempted to
write standards that nearly all regulatees were capable of achieving at little additional cost, the standards were still challenged in
court, and therefore were never implemented.29 6

Project 1986).
See, for example, James W. Vaupel, On the Benefits of Health and Safety Regulation, in Allen R. Ferguson and Phillip LeVeen, eds, The Benefits of Health and Safety
Regulation 2, 19 (Ballinger 1981) (Society spends more on saving the life and limb of the
wealthy and well educated.); Henry M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution
of Benefits and Costs, in Paul R. Portney, et al, eds, CurrentIssues in US Environmental
Policy 144, 144 (Johns Hopkins 1978) ("Regardless of the total benefits and costs.., some
parties will gain while others lose.").
" See Lead Industries Association, Inc. v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1152 (DC Cir 1980)
(EPA interprets Clean Air Act to provide for protection of sensitive subpopulations in
setting national primary ambient air quality standards.).
' See Greider, Who Will Tell the People at 56-57 (cited in note 24).
25 See text accompanying notes 146-47.
"' The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals unceremoniously remanded the standard to
the agency, including in that remand all of the contaminants subject to the standard,
whether or not they were challenged. AFL-CIO v OSHA, 965 F2d 962, 986-87 (11th Cir
1992). See generally McGarity and Shapiro, Workers at Risk at 268-77 (cited in note 55)
(criticizing argument that OSHA "overregulates" because its employee protections cannot
meet a cost-benefit test).
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6. Fear of ossification.
Although the unrepentant protectionists are not opposed in
principle to sound analysis of regulatory problems, they fear that
many of the cognitive regulatory reforms that the free marketeers, the modern mugwumps, and the good government
reinventionists advocate will lead to "paralysis by analysis."
Quantitative risk assessments and careful cost and economic-impact projections are time consuming and expensive. 97 Because
they always contain debatable assumptions and inferences, they
are ripe for criticism at the interagency and judicial review stages. Therefore, agencies feel obliged to include careful discussions
of all such assumptions and inferences and to back up factual
conclusions with the most recent data. The unrepentant protectionists believe that cognitive regulatory reforms have contributed to the "ossification" of the informal rule-making process.2 9
Pointing out that it is now virtually impossible for even well
endowed agencies to promulgate more than a dozen major rules
in a single year, they oppose new cognitive regulatory reforms
that would impose even more detailed regulatory impact assessment requirements.2 99
7. Skepticism about market-oriented approaches.
The unrepentant protectionists are not opposed in principle
to market-oriented approaches to achieving nonutilitarian regulatory goals. They are, however, skeptical about the efficacy of
market-based regulatory tools in practice. First, they worry that
because the protections that many regulatory agencies provide
defy easy measurement, the flexibility inherent in market-based
approaches will ensure that the underlying regulatory goals are
not in fact achieved.3" In the air pollution context, for example,
' See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 140-41 (cited in note 37) (tables detailing
the costs of preparing regulatory impact analyses).
'
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 Duke L J 1385, 1400-03 (1992).
29 See Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, Hearings on S 343 before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 22, 1995) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Director of Public Citizen
Litigation Group); Job Creation and Wage Enforcement Act of 1995, Hearings on HR 9 before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment and the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess 171 (Feb 1, 1995) (statement of Ellen Silbergeld, Environmental Defense Fund).
'0 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Thning"RegulatoryReforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1275-84
(1985).
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modeling inaccuracies and administrative constraints sometimes
result in trades that create "hot spots," or localized areas where
the media quality targets are exceeded. 0 ' In addition, many
market-oriented regulatory techniques are not sufficiently enforceable to prevent rampant cheating." 2 Moreover, a regulatory regime based upon tradable permits may be difficult to adjust
in light of new information or changed conditions. If the regulatory entity overestimates the number of marketable permits required to meet the goal, it may be very difficult to withdraw or
devalue existing permits once companies have gone to the expense of purchasing them.0 3 Finally, as previously discussed,
the unrepentant protectionists are concerned that some marketbased approaches
send the wrong symbolic messages to the citi34
zenry. 0
8. Cynicism about consensual and voluntary approaches.
The unrepentant protectionists are dubious about the efficacy
of the deliberative models offered by the modern mugwumps and
the voluntary approaches applauded by the good government
reinventionists. The idea of political equality in a "deliberative
democracy" that lies at the heart of modern civic republicanism is
a noble sentiment, but there is considerable tension between it
and the modern mugwump rejection of egalitarianism in the private sector and their advocacy of a robust role for the institution
of private property. To suppose that there can be true equality of
citizen participation in the political arena when there are huge
disparities of wealth in the private sector may be naive.0 5

. See Barry M. Mitnick, The PoliticalEconomy of Regulation: Creating,Designing,
and Removing Regulatory Forms 394 (Columbia 1980). See also Stewart, 9 Harv Envir L
Rev at 15-16 (cited in note 155).
" See Mitnick, PoliticalEconomy at 395 (cited in note 301) (suggesting that cheating
may be easier in a pollution permit regime than in one that uses pollution charges); Errol
Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of 'Emissions Trading' in U.S. Air Pollution
Regulation, 7 L & Policy 447, 461 (1985) (arguing that market mechanisms will be hard to
administer and may result in "innovations in evasion").
Meidinger, 7 L & Policy at 470 (cited in note 302); Lettie M. Wenner, The Environmental Decade in Court 53 (Indiana 1982).
.. See text accompanying notes 260-61.
3"5 See Seidenfeld, 105 Harv L Rev at 1537 (cited in note 174). In the context of complex informal rule making, for example, the civic republican ideal of deliberative democracy suggests that all affected entities should first reach a consensus about the policies
that guide the assumptions and inferences that are put into the quantitative analysis. But
who has the time to study the issues with the care needed to separate the science from
the policy? Only the citizens with an intense interest in the outcome and the money to
hire experts to aid them in the effort. The nature of the governmental activity thus
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The belief in the potential for consensus that also lies at the
core of the modern mugwump view may likewise be ill founded.
The beneficiaries of existing environmental, consumer, and labor
legislation chuckle at the prospect of a reasoned empathetic dialogue with the disciples of Newt Gingrich who believe that politics is war without guns. They worry that the modern mugwump
search for consensus about fundamental principles will necessarily be limited to the perspectives of an elite group of societal decision makers who, however gamely they strive to place civic virtue
over self-interest, are at least partially blind to the perspectives
of people who are not like them." 6 When the rich and powerful
find themselves in a minority, which will often be the case in
debates over protective regulation, they will dissent loudly in a
fashion that cannot be ignored.0 7 The unrepentant protectionists fear that the modern mugwump demand for consensus will
become a one-way street in which only deregulatory action can go
forward.
When they read of the good government reinventionists'
concern for government's customers, the unrepentant protectionists sometimes wonder who the customers really are. At first
glance, it would seem that the consumers of a regulatory program are the citizens that the agency's rules and regulations
were intended to protect. The reinvention rhetoric, however, often
suggests that its proponents in the government see their consumers as the industries from whom the regulatory beneficiaries are
seeking protection.0 8 The unrepentant protectionists are therefore leery of voluntary approaches toward protecting the powerless from the powerful. The good government reinventionist suggestion that greater reliance be placed on joint worker-management committees, for example, may increase worker satisfaction
and productivity, but it may also facilitate employer domination

creates a tension between deliberation and equality.
'
See Beermann and Singer, 23 Ga L Rev at 913 (cited in note 110); Eskridge and
Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 790 (cited in note 167).
'o
Greider, Who Will Tell the People at 51-52 (cited in note 24).
For example, most of the EPA's touted voluntary reinvention efforts are designed
to reduce regulatory burdens. Gore, Common Sense Government at 37-39 (cited in note
78). See United States General Accounting Office, Pub No GAOIT-GGD-95-206, Regulatory
Reform.. How Can CongressAssess the Administration'sInitiatives? 1 (1995) (statement of
L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues, concluding that the
two central themes of the Clinton administration's reinvention initiatives are: "(1) an
attempt to reduce the burden federal regulations and regulatory agencies impose on the
regulated public and (2) an attempt to change agencies' regulatory approach from a focus
on compliance with detailed procedures to a focus on achieving outcomes").
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of workers. 3" So long as the employer appears to be considering
employee claims seriously, it may not have to sacrifice any real
power. It is not clear why the government would be any more
effective in ensuring that such committees are legitimate than it
is in ensuring that workers are not fired for favoring a union.310
The unrepentant protectionists note that most of the "voluntary" programs advocated by the good government reinventionists
involve incentives designed to induce conduct that the agency is
powerless to compel. There is a very real danger, however, that
the government will give away more than it gains. For example,
when OSHA agreed in the early 1980s to reduce the frequency of
inspections for workplaces that voluntarily achieved below-average workplace injury rates, one predictable result was a rash of
underreporting of workplace accidents. 1' If the net result of the
program was to induce employers to hide, rather than prevent,
accidents, then the statute's worker protection goals were seriously undermined by the voluntary program.
9. Distrust of centralized management of bureaucracies.
The unrepentant protectionists are suspicious of centralized
management of the regulatory agencies, not so much out of a
conviction that centralized management is undesirable in principle as out of the unpleasant experience of having seen that process abused by previous administrations. In the past, centralized
review has provided an opportunity for regulatees ex parte to
arm OMB reviewers with arguments for changing the substance
of draft rules before they are published in the Federal Register."! Central reviewers have also urged agencies to adopt policy positions that run directly counter to their statutory missions. 3 Even when not used for sinister purposes, centralized
review provides yet another opportunity to delay the rule-making

'
310

See Hyde, 91 Colum L Rev at 466 (cited in note 274).
See Matthew W. Finkin, Back to the Future of Labor Law, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev

1005, 1018-19, 1024-25 (1991).
3 McGarity and Shapiro, Workers at Risk at ch 10 (cited in note 55).
312 See id at 141-48, 154. See also Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of
Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking
underExecutive Order 12,291, 4 Va J Natural Resources L 1, 28-35, 55-57 (1984); William
F. West and Joseph Cooper, Legislative Influence v. PresidentialDominance: Competing
Models of BureaucraticControl, 104 Pol Science Q 581, 596-97 (1989).
" See Oliver A. Houck, PresidentX and the New (Approved)Decisionmaking, 36 Am
U L Rev 535, 537-38 (1987). See also Louis L. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in AdministrativeLaw, 52 Harv L Rev 1201, 1238-39 (1939) (criticizing an early presidential push
to centralize control of independent agencies).
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process interminably. 14 The unrepentant protectionists therefore oppose structural regulatory reforms aimed at creating a
permanent institutional arrangement for centralized review.
10. Distaste for devolution.
The unrepentant protectionists have an inherent distaste for
structural reforms that result in greater devolution of regulatory
authority to states and localities. They note that nearly all of the
federal protections that Congress crafted resulted from long and
painful experience with ineffective state-administered programs.3" The efforts of southern (and many northern) states to
protect minorities from irrational discrimination had failed for a
century following the Civil War before Congress finally concluded
that federal intervention into private market arrangements was
necessary. Under state stewardship, the air and surface waters of
the United States were allowed to deteriorate to unconscionable
levels before Congress stepped in and enacted the modern pollution control statutes.316 The carnage in the workplace that lay
in the wake of decades of experience with weak and poorly enforced state worker-protection statutes prompted Congress to
create OSHA. The unrepentant protectionists believe that those
who would now have these vital protective programs devolve to
the states should shoulder the burden of demonstrating that the
states will be more capable than they have proved to be during
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. More specifically,
these would-be reformers must demonstrate that the states will
not succumb to the temptation to "race to the bottom" in order to
attract or retain politically powerful businesses.

34 See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 237 (cited in note 37); McGarity and

Shapiro, Workers at Risk at ch 15 (cited in note 55); Tolchin and Tolchin, Dismantling
America: The Rush to Deregulate at 41-42 (cited in note 288) (FDA official says that
probusiness Reagan administration brought things to a "snail's pace" with requests for
additional information.).
315 See Gore, Common Sense Government at 15 (cited in note 78) (reporting that "a
wide array of issues-pollution, poverty, and racial injustice, to name a few-became
federal responsibilities because they could not be solved by states acting on their own").
"16 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 Cornell L Rev
1101, 1194 (1988); Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in
RegulatoryFederalism, 70 Va L Rev 1429, 1433-34 (1984).
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IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
If the regulatory state does in fact stand at a crossroads, it is
appropriate to speculate about the direction that it will take in
the future. At least four scenarios are plausible.
A. The Radical Relief Scenario
The radical anti-interventionists' agenda for the 104th Congress includes enactment of important omnibus regulatory reform
legislation, generic property rights legislation, and substantial
amendments to, or repeals of, existing protective statutes. The
"Contract with America" promised the first two reforms, and
legislation aimed at accomplishing the third was introduced in
the House of Representatives soon after it was called to order.317 The House of Representatives has passed a radical regulatory reform bill 18 that, among other things, would: make costbenefit analysis a decisional criterion for all major rules; define
the term "major" to include a vastly greater number of regulations than in the past; subject existing major rules to reexamination under the new decisional criterion; require detailed regulatory analyses and peer review for major rules; entitle landowners to compensation for specified governmental actions that diminish property values by twenty percent; and subject all of the
analyses and substantive decisions to judicial review." The
House has also passed amendments to the Clean Water Act that
would radically limit the scope and focus of that statute,32 and
the House is seriously considering radical amendments to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act that would assign to OSHA
a largely consultative role.32 '

", See Gillespie and Schellhas, eds, Contract with America at 126-28 (cited in note
79); Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, HR 9, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4,
1995), in 141 Cong Rec H124 (Jan 5, 1995); HR 961, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 15, 1995),
in 141 Cong Rec H1849 (Feb 15, 1995) (comprehensive amendments to Clean Water Act);
HR 479, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 11, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H229 (Jan 11, 1995) (bill
introduced by House Majority Whip Tom DeLay calling for repeal of Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990); Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, HR 450, 104th Cong, 1st Sess
(Jan 9, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H157-58 (Jan 9, 1995) (calling for a moratorium on new
listings of endangered species and designation of critical habitat).
318 141 Cong
ec H2618-19 (Mar 3, 1995).
3- HR 9 §§ 203, 402(3), 421-24, 431, 441 (cited in note 82).
' HR 961, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (May 16, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H5013 (May 16,
1995).
"2 See Ballenger Bill Would Refocus OSHA Mission to Consultative Efforts, Daily
Labor Rep (BNA) A-14, A-14 to A-15 (June 15, 1995); BallengerBill Would Limit OSHA,
Merge It With MSHA, Natl J Cong Daily 4 (June 14, 1995).
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Although the momentum for radical reforms has remained
strong in the House, it has diminished considerably in the more
deliberative Senate. After struggling for months to come up with
an omnibus regulatory reform bill that would survive a cloture
vote, the Senate Republican leadership gave up, and it is entirely
possible that no omnibus regulatory reform legislation will
emerge from the 104th Congress."
Furthermore, there is evidence that the radical anti-interventionists have already pushed the agenda beyond the considerable
tolerance of thoughtful citizens who vote in elections and write
their congresspersons."m In part because of the media coverage
that the House leadership invited, the unrepentant protectionists
and their allies in Congress received a highly visible forum for
their arguments that the Contract with America was a reactionary call for a return to a world in which private entrepreneurs
are free to dictate the conditions of employment, the country's
natural resources are easily available for private exploitation,
and vast private accumulations of wealth mock the devastating
poverty of those who do not hop aboard the fast train to prosperity.
Although the unrepentant protectionists and the good government reinventionists have so far successfully fought rearguard battles in Congress, if they are unable to translate the
defensive legislative victories of 1995 into electoral votes in 1996,
the regulatory state is in for some profound changes.

' The House passed HR 9 on March 3, 1995. 141 Cong Rec H2639 (Mar 3, 1995).
After weeks of debate in mid-June and July 1995, the Senate very nearly passed a version
of S 343. That bill represented a compromise between the version of S 343 reported out of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, a somewhat less comprehensive bill (S 333) reported out
of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and a more moderate bill (S 291)
reported out of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. See John Sullivan, Committee Work on Rules Relief Done, Attention Turns to Craftinga FloorBill, Daily Labor Rep
(BNA) A-13, A-13 to A-14 (May 2, 1995). As S 343 neared floor consideration, it was
amended on two more occasions (without the benefit of committee hearings) by the staffs
of Senator Dole and Senator Bennett Johnston in an effort to produce a bill that both Republicans and conservative Democrats could support so as to pretermit any possible filibuster. See Dole, Johnston Reach Senate Regulatory Reform Deal, Natl J Cong Daily 1, 1
(June 22, 1995); Johnston, Dole Reach Tentative Agreement on New Senate Regulatory
Reform Package, Daily Rep Exec (BNA) A34 (June 21, 1995).
' See Richard L. Berke, The Mellowing of the American Voter, NY Times Section 4 at
1, 4 (Jan 7, 1996); Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 250 (cited in note 11) (acknowledging that
the public has not (yet) accepted the radical anti-interventionist agenda).
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B. The Gridlock Scenario
Another plausible scenario is a sustained impasse in which
the good government reinventionists win the initial battles
against the radical anti-interventionists and the free marketeers,
and the political heat generated by the anti-interventionists slowly dissipates. The Clinton administration is filled with good government reinventionists who control much of the federal bureaucracy. In this scenario, protective legislation will periodically
come up for reauthorization, but the President (be it Clinton or
Gore) will threaten to veto any congressional attempts to replace
existing statutes with radically different regulatory frameworks.
Unless the electorate sends Republicans to Congress in even
greater numbers than it did in 1994, the prospects for overriding
those vetoes are not very high. The result could be a sustained
gridlock during which very little new legislation is enacted, reduced agency budgets preclude effective enforcement of existing
regulations, and the executive branch continues to experiment
with consensual and voluntary techniques for protecting regulatory beneficiaries.
C. The Free Market Scenario
It is possible that as the pendulum begins its swing back
toward further protections, the modern mugwumps will have
their day in the sun: Congress will enact less radical legislation
that accomplishes some reform, but is still palatable to President
Clinton and moderate Democrats. Congress could enact "reasonable" reforms providing for greater use of performance standards
and market incentives with a decisional criterion that allows, but
does not require, agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis in writing regulations. The legislation might even incorporate some
modern mugwump elements such as broader opportunities for
public participation and prohibitions on ex parte contacts with
OMB.
It may well be, however, that the mugwump belief in the
middle ground is untenable. This scenario presumes a broad
middle ground of public opinion that can be energized by presbyterian appeals to moderation and civic virtue. However, the
years since the end of the Vietnam War may have so polarized
the citizenry that there is no middle America to be won over. In a
political milieu in which negative campaigning is the order of the
day and public cynicism about what motivates politicians seems
deeper than ever, modern mugwump appeals to civility in public
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discourse may be welcome, but irrelevant. The modern mugwumps face a dilemma in that their substantive solutions cannot
command anything like a consensus among the affected interests.
As a result, they play the undesirable role of apologist for substantive policies that advance the partisan agendas of the radical
anti-interventionists and free marketeers.
D. The Revived Regulation Scenario
Although we are probably not in the midst of a
transformative constitutional moment, the short-term prognosis
for protective regulation in American society is as poor as it has
been since the end of the New Deal. While it is always possible
that some traumatic event or steep economic downturn will allow
the unrepentant protectionists to assume the offensive, Congress
is not likely to enact significant protectionist statutes during the
next decade. The prospects for a revived regulation scenario are
probably highest if the radical relief scenario first plays itself out.
Congress may be willing to contemplate enacting additional
protections only after a period of time in which the radical antiinterventionists and free marketeers have their way: the existing
protective statutes are repealed or undermined, the free market
reigns supreme, the consequences of unrestrained capitalism
become increasingly apparent, and pressures build to remedy the
most egregious abuses. It may, in other words, take another
tragedy like the Great Depression to revive the conviction that
government has an important protective role to play in private
arrangements.
CONCLUSION

Of the scenarios outlined above, the second and third are the
most probable. Both the radical relief scenario and the revived
regulation scenario include a definitive victory for the radical
anti-interventionists and the free marketeers, and this would
probably require that the Republicans both retake the White
House and build on the electoral successes of 1994 in Congress.
While neither outcome is beyond the realm of possibility, the
combination is not very likely. Whether gridlock will prevail or
moderate market-based legislation will be enacted depends upon
a number of factors. If the hard-line anti-interventionists refuse
to budge or if the unrepentant protectionists are especially persuasive, gridlock will continue into the foreseeable future. If,
however, most members of Congress become persuaded that
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there is a large constituency for middle-ground solutions, then a
viable, but much less protective, regulatory state may emerge
from this particular crossroads.

